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Book Review
Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act
HuMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE. Edited by
Lance A. Compat & Stephen F. Diamond.* Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1996. Pp. vi, 311. $39 .9 5 .f
Reviewed By Sarah H. Cleveland*
Are labor rights human rights? Are some worker rights so fundamen-
tal that they must be respected by all nations, and all corporations, under
all circumstances? If so, who has authority to define such rights, and how
should they be enforced? What is the effect on the global economy of
enforcing international worker rights? These are some of the questions
confronted by the authors of Human Rights, Labor Rights, and
International Trade, a compilation of essays by an international group of
scholars, labor rights activists, and corporate executives addressing
contemporary topics in the dialectic among labor, trade, and human rights.
tSenior Lecturer, Cornell University School of Labor and Industrial Relations; Director of Labor
Law and Economic Research of the Secretariat of the North American Commission for Labor
Cooperation, 1995-1997. B.A. 1969, Fordham University; J.D. 1973, Yale Law School.
*Associate, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, P.C., Palo Alto, California; B.A. 1977,
University of California; Ph.D. 1991, University of London; J.D. 1994, Yale Law School.
tHereinafter cited by page number only.
* Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law; A.B. 1987, Brown University; M.St.
1989, Oxford University; J.D. 1992, Yale Law School. I am grateful for the advice, inspiration, and
support of Harold Hongju Koh, Douglas Laycock, and Steven Ratner, for information on recent devel-
opments from Terry Collingsworth, Jennifer Green, Michael Wishnie, and Emily Yozell, and for the
tireless research and assistance of Michael J. Yoch.
1. For further discussion of international labor rights and their relation to the global economy, see,
e.g., INTERNATIONALLABOR RIGHTS EDUC. AND RESEARCH FUND, TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS: WORKER
RIGHTS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY (1988) [hereinafter TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS]; ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A
STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996) [hereinafter OECD STUDY];
Philip Alston, Commodity Agreements-As Though People Don't Matter, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 455
(1981); Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent
Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 131 (1997)
(reviewing ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTS, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT
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Workers, advocates, and governments have long pressed for interna-
tional cooperation in developing a global worker-rights regime. The idea
of international collaboration was urged at the Congress of Vienna in
1815;2 Kaiser Wilhelm convened the first international labor standards
conference in Berlin in 1890;3 and the International Labour Organization
(ILO) was organized in 1919 to develop international standards and
promote international cooperati6n in labor rights. Proposals for
"linkage"-or conditioning trade privileges on compliance with
international labor standards-also are not new. The United States banned
importation of convict-made goods as early as 1890;4 the British Board of
Trade proposed an international treaty forbidding trade in prison-made
products in 1895, and a similar bar was proposed for inclusion in the
Treaty of Versailles at the close of World War .5 The possibility of
linkage between worker rights and trade was raised at the 1927 World
Economic Conference, 6 and the 1948 Charter of the International Trade
Organization included a commitment to fair labor standards.7 Although
the world community has proven increasingly effective over this period at
AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONALTRADE (1996))
[hereinafter Chamovitz, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards]; Steve Chamovitz, The Influence
of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L
LAB. REv. 565 (1987); Steve Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards andInternational Trade, 20 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 61 (1986); Gus Edgren, Fair Labour Standards and Trade Liberalisation, 118 INT'L LAB.
REv. 523 (1979); Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade
Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990); Harlan Mandel, Note,
In Pursuit of the Missing Link: International Worker Rights and International Trade?, 27 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 443 (1989). Other useful recent sources in the area of international labor rights and
trade are collected in David Weissbrodt & Marci Hoffman, The Global Economy and Human Rights:
A Selective Bibliography, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 189 (1997).
2. See C.K. WEBSTER, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1814-1815, at 76 (1918) (noting that a report
issued by the Congress's Conference on the Slave Trade resulted in "a formal declaration on the
subject"). The earliest advocates of the internationalization of worker rights were European
industrialists, politicians, doctors, and prison wardens, all of whom felt that market forces prevented
improvements from being effective at the national level. See LAMMY BETrEN, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR LAW 2-3 (1993).
3. See Denis MacShane, Human Rights and LaborRights: A European Perspective, in Pp. 48, 53;
see also BETTEN, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the 1890 Berlin conference).
4. See Steve Chamovitz, Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15 WORLD ECON. 335,
337, 339-41 (1992).
5. See Charnovitz, Trade, Employment, andLabour Standards, supra note 1, at 162 (citing 2 THE
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 328 (James T. Shotwell ed., 1934)).
6. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
232 (1927) (containing a proposal by the British Labour Party and Trades Union Congress for an inter-
national agreement boycotting goods produced in conditions that failed to satisfy ILO standards).
7. See OECD STUDY, supra note 1, at 169; Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, art. 7(1), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES, PUB. NO.
3206, at 32 (providing that "[t]he Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in
production for export, create difficulties in international trade").
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promulgating labor standards, it has often proven equally ineffective at
enforcing them.'
Since 1984, however, international labor rights have gained increasing
credence and attention, and efforts to define the scope of international
obligations toward workers have penetrated all levels of the international
community, from multilateral treaties overseen by U.N. agencies to volun-
tary codes of corporate conduct designed to avert labor violations at the
shop floor level. These events reflect the culmination of three important
developments over the past several decades, which have raised the dialogue
regarding international human rights, labor rights, and trade to new
importance. First, the globalization of trade and investment, and the
concomitant diversification of private and national economic interests, have
created both the impetus and the need to focus attention on international
worker rights. Corporations no longer produce or sell within national
borders, with the result that working conditions abroad have gained
significance both from a human rights and a trading privileges perspective.
Second, this period has seen the development and legitimization of
comprehensive international norms regarding both trade and human
rights-whether in the form of global treaties such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), regional agreements such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union
(EU), or the "soft law" rulings of international agencies such as the ILO.
Finally, the world has developed a variety of new methods for enforc-
ing these norms: through international and regional courts and agencies
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Court of
Human Rights, and the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals;
through domestic regulatory agencies and private corporations; and through
"transnational public law litigation," in which private litigants seek the
articulation and vindication of international rights in domestic courts.'
Around the world today, while states bring complaints against states for
trade violations before the WTO, torturers and perpetrators of genocide are
being indicted and held accountable in international criminal tribunals in
8. As Steve Chamovitz has noted, this tension is starkly reflected in the ongoing debates over the
ILO's effectiveness. See Charnovitz, Trade, Employment, andLabour Standards, supra note 1, at 160-
63. Compare Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Remarks at the Meeting of the Section on International Law of
the American Association of Law Schools, International Trade and Social Welfare: The New Agenda,
in 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 338, 351 (1996) (arguing that few nations have complied with 11.0 conventions
and that the organization's impact on international law has been minimal), with Nicolas Valticos, The
ILO: A Retrospective and Future View, 135 INT'L LAB. REV. 473, 475 (1996) (arguing that ILO con-
ventions have had an important impact on international labor law and have received approximately
6,300 ratifications).
9. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2347-49
(1991) (describing the historical origins and contemporary status of transnational public law litigation).
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the Hague and Tanzania, are facing criminal charges in domestic fora in
Italy, France, and Spain,'0 and are being sued for civil damages in the
United States." As Harold Koh has described, this process is helping to
create a fluid system of transnational legal accountability, in which norms
are articulated and enforced in a variety of fora, both domestic and
international, by and against a variety of parties, be they states,
multinational corporations, or private individuals.' 2 In short, as the
definition and enforcement of both trade and human rights have become
internationalized, it is hardly surprising that activists, policy makers,
business interests, and jurists increasingly have looked to places where
these two streams have met.
Although many governments and corporations continue to oppose any
linkage between trade and labor rights, there is a growing recognition that
the international economy and the international labor rights movement
share a common goal: workers who earn a living wage, who labor with
autonomy in conditions that respect basic health and safety, in turn become
consumers who can purchase what they want. As such, they contribute
both to the expansion of the global economy and to the elimination of the
extreme conditions of poverty where labor violations flourish.3
10. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATRocrTIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (1997) (describing recent prosecutions in France, Spain, and
Italy of perpetrators of Argentina's "dirty war").
11. See, e.g., Kadic v. KaradNti, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996).
12. See Koh, supra note 9, at 2371; see also Harold Hongiu Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-58 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-94 (1996) (both describing the present transnational legal system
as one in which norms no longer are distinguishable as public-private or domestic-international, but
form a monistic system of overlapping national and international institutions and rules).
13. See Denis MacShane, Asia: The Next Frontier for Trade Unions, 5 PAC. REV. 1, 3 (1992).
Former United States Secretary of Labor and labor economist Ray Marshall and others have written
extensively on the relationship between labor standards, high-skill forms of work organization, and
increased productivity. See, e.g., RAY MARSHALL & MARC TUCKER, THINKING FOR A LIVING (1992);
Ray Marshall, The Role of Management and Competitiveness Strategies in Occupational Safety and
Health Standards, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 499, 505-08
(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997); R. Michael Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational Enterprises
and International Labor Standards: Which Way for Development and Jobs?, in P. 141; Stephen
Herzenberg, In from the Margins: Morality, Economics, and International Labor Rights, in P. 99;
Michael J. Piore, Labor Standards and Business Strategies, in LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 35 (Stephen A. Herzenberg & Jorge F. Perez-Lopez eds., 1990). For these
commentators, rather than being primarily a moral issue, respect for basic labor rights such as freedom
of association, occupational health and safety, and skills development makes good business sense.
From their perspective, the labor rights problem is not simply the failure of certain corporations and
countries to respect a laundry list of discrete labor rights, but a structural problem created by forms
of work organization which emphasize sweatshop strategies of low-skill, low-wage production over
high-skill, high value-added forms of production. See NATIONAL CENTER ON EDUCATION AND THE
ECONOMY, AMERICA'S CHOICE, HIGH SKILLS OR Low WAGES! (1990). Such forms of production are
predominant in cottage and light manufacturing industries in the Caribbean, in Mexico's maquiladora
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Moreover, although states wearing their international trade hats may
oppose linkage between labor rights and trade, such linkage exists de facto,
because most member states of the GATT and the WTO also have acceded
to international conventions obligating them to respect and enforce basic
labor rights.
Nevertheless, the status of many labor rights remains controversial and
ambiguous, and definitions of some recognized rights remain so vague as
to be nearly unenforceable. Consideration of labor rights in international
trade agreements, and particularly in GATT negotiations for the WTO,
remains highly controversial-so controversial, indeed, that last fall a
dispute over the presence, or absence, of labor rights provisions in a new
regional trade agreement contributed to the most important foreign trade
defeat of the Clinton administration.' 4
Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade presents a
groundbreaking analysis of many aspects of this debate. The articles
collected in the volume grew out of a March 1992 symposium entitled
"Human Rights and Labor Rights: A New Look at Workers in the Global
Economy," sponsored by Yale Law School's Orville H. Schell Center for
International Human Rights. The collection is divided into three segments,
respectively addressing Labor Rights and Human Rights, Labor Rights and
Trade, and Litigating International Labor Rights. The book opens with an
article by Yale University labor historian David Montgomery, who places
the current debates in historical context and discusses the ongoing need for
international labor solidarity in pressing for enforceable worker rights.
Virginia Leary grapples with the question of what, if any, labor rights can
be considered fundamental human rights, focusing primarily on the right
to freedom of association as reflected in ILO conventions and international
human rights instruments.
A number of the authors consider regional or domestic efforts to
define and enforce international labor rights. Denis MacShane, for
example, offers a European perspective on the human rights, labor rights,
and trade linkage debate, and points to current developments in the EU as
an example of regional efforts to address the issue. Steven F. Diamond
takes an early look at NAFTA and the labor side agreement, placing
NAFTA in the context of the transnational economy and the weakened
plants, and in the export processing zones of many developing countries. Minimum labor standards
help eliminate this low-wage option by forcing employers to focus on increasing productivity rather
than suppressing wages. This high-wage, high-skill strategy has been pursued successfully by European
companies, with governmental encouragement, for many years. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, U.S.A.
and UK Government Policy in Youth Training for the New International Economy: Lessons from
Abroad, 2 OXFORD STUD. COMP. EDUC. 107, 119-25 (1992).
14. See Jill Abramson & Steven Greenhouse, Labor Victory on Trade Bill Reveals Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at Al (discussing labor's efforts to defeat President Clinton's fast-track bill).
1998] 1537
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U.S. labor movement. Philip Alston offers a penetrating critique of efforts
to condition U.S. foreign trade laws on compliance with international
human rights, and he condemns the United States's "aggressive
unilateralism" as undermining ILO efforts to build a global consensus in
this area.
Steven Herzenberg, R. Michael Gadbaw, and Michael T. Medwig
place the international labor rights movement in the context of the global
economy, examining the relationship between the goals of international
labor standards and global economic development, and discussing the
extent to which linkage of trade and labor standards can help, or hinder,
such development. Cecilia Green, in turn, considers this problem from the
ground-level perspective of low-wage workers in the light manufacturing
sectors of the Caribbean. Daniel Ehrenberg proposes an innovative solu-
tion for cooperative enforcement of labor rights, combining the trade sanc-
tion authority of the WTO with the labor standards expertise of the ILO.
Lance Compa and Tashia Hinchliffe Darricarr~re turn to private corporate
efforts to respect worker rights, examining the development of voluntary
"codes of conduct" for the activities of multinational corporations abroad.
Finally, labor rights litigators Terry Collingsworth, Frank Deale, and
Emily Yozell explore the possibilities offered by domestic litigation for
promoting international worker rights. Through their explication of three
sample cases, the authors consider the doctrinal, and in particular, the
practical, economic, ethical, and strategic obstacles to representing the
interests of workers in distant fora.
Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade provides
valuable insights into the labor rights and trade debate. As a collection of
expert perspectives, its weakness, if any, is the lack of a comprehensive
perspective on the issues discussed. This Review accordingly attempts to
provide the overview that the book lacks, in light of recent developments
in the fields of trade and labor rights. Part I examines the transnational
labor-rights regime, including the doctrinal framework and the variety of
global, regional, domestic, and private enforcement mechanisms that have
proliferated at the intersection of labor, trade, and human rights. Part 1I
argues that although impressive inroads have been made in many areas, the
global community continues to disagree fundamentally about two important
questions in labor rights: the possibility of a universal definition of
"relative" labor rights such as wages and work place conditions; and the
appropriateness of direct linkage between trade sanctions and labor
practices. Finally, Part III argues that the Alien Tort Claims Act,' 5 which
has experienced a burgeoning importance in transnational human rights liti-
gation in the United States, also has an important, if narrowly confined,
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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role to play in the enforcement of the prohibition against forced labor and
other universally recognized worker rights.
I. The Transnational Labor Rights Regime: Defining and Enforcing
Fundamental Worker Rights
This Part describes the transnational labor rights regime, a loose but
interlocking network of structures for the definition and enforcement of
fundamental labor rights. At the global level, the ILO's conventions and
recommendations, and multilateral human rights instruments, play a crucial
role in delineating and defining worker rights but provide few options for
enforcement. At the regional level, the EU and NAFTA provide two
examples of multilateral efforts at labor rights protection, with the EU
enjoying the strongest definitional and enforcement mechanisms.
Domestically, the United States has contributed to the possibility of labor
rights enforcement by conditioning various trade and foreign assistance
benefits on compliance with fundamental rights. Corporate "codes of
conduct" and social labeling efforts have brought labor rights enforcement
to the shop floor, and domestic litigation offers creative and largely
unexplored possibilities for refining and enforcing international labor
rights.
A. The Global Regime: The 1LO and Multilateral Instruments
International agencies and instruments have played a foundational role
in identifying and refining fundamental worker rights. Since its instigation
nearly eighty years ago, the ILO has promulgated 177 conventions regard-
ing a wide range of worker rights. 6 The ILO identifies seven of these
conventions as setting forth "fundamental human rights," which must be
respected by all nations under all circumstances.' These include various
conventions protecting freedom of association and the right to organize and
bargain collectively," the forced labor conventions, 9 and the
16. Uniquely among United Nations organizations, ILO standards are developed and implemented
on a tripartite basis, through cooperation among representatives of governments, labor, and employer
organizations.
17. International Labour Organization, Human Rights: Human Rights in the Working World
(visited Feb. 25, 1998) < http://www.ilo.org/public/english/5Onormes/human.htm> [hereinafter ILO,
Human Rights].
18. See Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
(No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 16, reprinted in I INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1991, at 435 (1992) [hereinafter LABOUR CONVENTIONS] (entered into force
July 4, 1950); Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and
to Bargain Collectively (No. 98), July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257, reprinted in I LABOUR
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 524 (entered into force July 18, 1951).
19. See Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 55, reprinted in 1 LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 115 (entered into force May 1,
1998] 1539
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conventions protecting equal pay and prohibiting discrimination in
employment.' With the notable exception of the United States, which
has ratified only one of the core ILO conventions (No. 105),2" the core
conventions are nearly universally embraced. To date, at least 119 nations
have formally agreed to adhere to each of these conventions.' The ILO
also lists as "fundamental" the child labor convention, although only 51
states have ratified that instrument23s
The basic labor rights have been incorporated into foundational
international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Declaration),24 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),' and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).26  All three of these instruments
guarantee the right to freedom of association, including the right to form
and join trade unions, 7 and the right to freedom from discrimination.28
1932) [hereinafter Forced Labour Convention]; Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour
(No. 105), June 25, 1957, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-7 (1993), 320 U.N.T.S. 291, reprinted in I
LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 618 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959, entered into force in
the U.S. Sept. 25, 1992).
20. See Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of
Equal Value (No. 100), June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303, reprinted in 1 LABOUR CONVENTIONS,
supra note 18, at 529 (entered into force May 23, 1953); Convention Concerning Discrimination in
Respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in 1
LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 702 (entered into force June 15, 1960).
21. See David Montgomery,Labor Rights and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective, in Pp. 13,
17.
22. See ILO, Human Rights, supra note 17. Specifically, the ILO reports the following total rati-
fications for these Conventions:
Convention No. 29: 143 ratifications
Convention No. 87: 119 ratifications
Convention No. 98: 133 ratifications
Convention No. 100:127 ratifications
Convention No. 105: 120 ratifications
Convention No. 111: 123 ratifications
Id.
23. Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No. 138), June 26,
1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297, reprinted in 2 LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1030 (entered into
force June 19, 1976).
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Declaration].
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
26. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
27. See Declaration, supra note 24, arts. 20, 23, at 75; ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 22, 999
U.N.T.S. at 178, 6 1.L.M. at 374-75; ICESCR, supra note 26, art. 8, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6-7, 6 I.L.M.
at 362.
28. See Declaration, supra note 24, arts. 2, 7, at 72-73; ICCPR, supra note 25, arts. 3, 26, 999
U.N.T.S. at 174, 179, 6 I.L.M. at 369, 375; ICESCR, supra note 26, arts. 3, 7(c), 993 U.N.T.S. at
5-6, 6 1.L.M. at 361-62.
1540
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The Declaration and ICCPR also prohibit slavery and servitude. 29 Thus,
these rights may be considered the core of an evolving positive and cus-
tomary international law of labor and human rights.3"
Possibilities for enforcement of these provisions at the international
level, however, are extremely limited. The ILO has established a vast
expertise in promulgating labor standards and has authority to provide tech-
nical assistance, oversee labor conditions, and publicize violations. It has
no ability to impose sanctions, however, and its enforcement authority is
limited to "mobilizing shame" '3 against member state violators.
Similarly, the human rights instruments themselves provide few possibil-
ities for sanction-backed enforcement. The U.N. Human Rights
Committee, which is responsible for oversight of state compliance with the
ICCPR, has limited investigatory and reporting authority but no ability to
impose sanctions.32 Efforts to achieve global enforcement of these rights
by linking state labor practices to trading privileges under the WTO
repeatedly have faltered, as discussed in Part II. Thus, elaboration and
enforcement of the standards prescribed at the global level is left largely
to regional and national mechanisms.
29. See Declaration, supra note 24, art. 4, at 73; ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 175, 6 I.L.M. at 371.
30. In its 1996 study, the OECD similarly identified (1) freedom of association and the right of
collective bargaining; (2) the prohibition of forced labor; (3) the prohibition of discrimination in
employment; and (4) the prohibition of exploitative forms of child labor as "core" labor standards. See
OECD STUDY, supra note 1, at 25. The OECD describes these standards as expressing "well-
established elements of international jurisprudence concerning human rights." Id. at 27. The U.S.
State Department also recognizes that
[ain international consensus exists, based on several key International Labor Organization
(ILO) Conventions, that certain worker rights constitute core labor standards. These
include freedom of association-which is the foundation on which workers can form trade
unions and defend their interests; the right to organize and bargain collectively; freedom
from gender and other discrimination in employment; and freedom from forced and child
labor.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OVERVIEW TO
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997 (1998), available in 1997Human Rights
Report: Overview, (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/globallhuman-rights
1997_hrpreportioverview.html >.
31. Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organisation, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 580, 600, 595-602 (Philip Alston
ed., 1992).
32. See ICCPR, supra note 25, arts. 28-45,999 U.N.T.S. 179-84, 6 I.L.M. 376-81 (outlining the
structure and authority of the Human Rights Committee). The jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) is limited to claims between states that have submitted voluntarily to the court's
jurisdiction. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36(2). Decisions of the court
are enforceable only through action of the U.N. Security Council. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94, 2;
see also Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 934 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (holding that "neither individuals nor organizations have a cause of action in an American
court to enforce ICJ judgments").
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B. Regional Labor Rights Regimes
1. The European Union.-Regional economic and political agreements
also have given increasing attention to questions of worker rights.
Undoubtedly the most advanced such agreement is the so-called "Social
Chapter"33 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty,' the foundational instrument
of the EU.35  The Social Chapter is a modem outgrowth of the social
provisions of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,36 the 1961 European Social Charter
adopted by the Council of Europe,37 the 1989 Social Charter,38 and the
implementing Social Action Programme. 39  The Chapter obligates mem-
bers of the EU4 to respect the following basic rights: (1) freedom of
movement; (2) employment and fair remuneration; (3) living and working
conditions; (4) social protection; (5) freedom of association and collective
bargaining; (6) vocational training; (7) equal pay for men and women; (8)
information, consultation, and participation rights; (9) workplace health and
safety; (10) protection of children; (11) protection of the elderly; and (12)
33. See Protocol on Social Policy, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 357, 357-58 (entered into force Nov.
1, 1993); Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States of the European
Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Dec. 10,
1991, 31 I.L.M. 358, 358-61 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993).
34. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 117, O.J. (C 224)
45 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
35. See Roger J. Goebel, Employee Rights in the European Community: A Panorama from the
1974 SocialAction Program to the Social Charter of 1989, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 1,
95 (1993) (describing the evolution of the EU social policy); see also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., From
the Social Charter to the Social Action Program 1995-97: European Union Employment Law Comes
Alive, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43, 48-60 (1996) (discussing the "European Model" of employment
relations); Craig L. Jackson, Social Policy Harmonization and Worker Rights in the European Union:
A Model for North America?, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 1, 21-32 (1995) (comparing
approaches to worker rights under the EU and NAFTA).
36. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
37. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
38. Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, in COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECrORATE-GENERALFOR EMPLOYMENT, INDUS. RELATIONS AND SOC.
AFFAIRS, I Soc. EUR. 46 (1990) (outlining the fundamental rights of workers). The 1989 Social
Charter delineated goals in the twelve areas of worker rights reflected in the Maastricht Treaty Social
Chapter but lacked legal force due to the United Kingdom's refusal to sign. For further discussion of
the 1989 Social Charter, see generally John T. Addison & W. Stanley Siebert, The Social Charter of
the European Community: Evolution and Controversies, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 597 (1991).
39. Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Programme Relating to the
Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, COM(89)568 final.
40. The Social Chapter provisions of the Maastricht Treaty originally were adopted separately by
the other eleven original members of the EU after the United Kingdom refused to accept them as an
integral part of the treaty. See Dowling, supra note 35, at 54; Goebel, supra note 35, at 95. The
U.K., however, signed the Social Chapter in June 1997, and Prime Minister Tony Blair has promised
that the U.K. will ratify the treaty as part of his New Labour agenda. See John Kampfner, Minister
Backs EU Social Chapter, FIN. TIMES (Europe ed.), Nov. 13, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL
14792841.
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protection of the disabled.4' The most important development under the
Social Chapter is that issues relating to working conditions, sex equality,
and other worker concerns are now subject to qualified majority voting
among Union members, whereas labor rights provisions other than health
and safety previously required unanimity and were routinely blocked by the
United Kingdom.42 Thus, the Maastricht Treaty makes possible the
majoritarian adoption of trans-European workplace rights, creating the only
regional system of workplace regulation in the world.43
This EU system provides for "upward harmonization" of worker
rights.'4 Commission directives are intended to establish the floor
below which no member state may go, although states are welcome to pro-
vide protections in excess of the Commission's directives. Directives gen-
erally must be individually implemented by member states according to
their own "choice of form and methods."45
Importantly, trans-European labor provisions are enforceable both
through national courts and through the European Court of Justice of the
European Communities (ECJ). Member states and the Commission are
allowed to bring original actions before the ECJ, alleging that another state
has failed to comply with the Convention's provisions or to enact legisla-
tion implementing a directive. '6 Under Article 177 of the European
Economic Community Treaty, individuals may enforce rights protected by
EU law in their domestic courts, with decisions rendered regarding EU law
reviewable in the European Court.47 National courts may also request
advisory rulings from the ECJ on interpretations of EU law arising in
domestic litigation.48
In addition to the rules and mechanisms available under the Social
Chapter, the EU recently agreed to a provision that directly links the
41. See MacShane, supra note 3, at 69 n.12; see also Jackson, supra note 35, at 31 (noting that
the Maastricht Social Chapter "covers the same ground" as the 1989 Social Action Programme).
42. The EU continues to require unanimous voting for instruments relating to social security,
employment contract terminations, collective bargaining, and immigration. See Dowling, supra note
35, at 55.
43. The European Commission has issued three directives under the Social Chapter, relating to
sex discrimination in employment, European works councils, and unpaid parental leave. See Geoff
Meade, "Opt-Out" Still Bars UKfrom Equality Vote, PRESS ASS'N NEWSFILE, June 26, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Robert Taylor, UK Clarifies Social Chapter Position, FIN.
TIMES, June 13, 1997, at 2 (discussing the possibility of amendments to the Social Chapter pertaining
to sexual discrimination).
44. See EC TREATY art. 117.
45. Id. art. 189 (as amended 1992).
46. See id. art. 169 (allowing the Commission to bring an action); id. art. 170 (allowing states to
bring actions).
47. For further discussion of the legal structure of the EU, see Jackson, supra note 35, at 16-21.
48. See EC TREATY art. 177 (as amended 1992).
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granting of EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) trade benefits to
compliance with worker rights and provides special incentives for countries
that adopt and apply core ILO standards.49 The EU invoked the provision
to terminate GSP benefits to Burma due to that country's forced labor
policies, representing the first time that the EU has formally linked trade
benefits with worker rights.5 0
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement. -Compared to
Europe, regional efforts at overseeing worker rights protections are
newcomers to the western hemisphere. Responding to pressure from
domestic labor groups, Congress and President Clinton conditioned their
approval of NAFTA in 1993 on the adoption of the so-called "labor side
agreement," the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC). The NAALC stands as the first regional labor agreement
among the United States, Canada, and Mexico and as the first international
trade agreement conditioned on labor protections that the United States has
ever signed.52 Unlike the European Social Chapter, the NAALC is not
designed to require "upward harmonization" of regional labor standards.
The agreement instead requires the NAFTA member countries to comply
with and enforce their domestic labor laws, and to ensure the availability
of fair domestic tribunals to adjudicate labor disputes. The NAALC also
establishes an international complaint process through which interested
private parties may challenge another country's compliance with its own
labor laws.
The NAALC recognizes eleven labor rights as fundamental: (1) free-
dom of association and the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain
collectively; (3) the right to strike; (4) the prohibition of forced labor; (5)
the prohibition of child labor; (6) minimum employment standards
49. See OECD STUDY, supra note 1, at 186-88.
50. See Caroline Southey & Ted Bardacke, Brussels Urges Lifting of Burma Privileges, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at 4.
51. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, openedfor signature Sept. 8, 1993, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1994) [hereinafter NAALC]; see also Betty Southard Murphy, NAFTA's
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: The Present and the Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.
403, 404-06 (1995) (describing the United States's position, which required a labor "side agreement"
for NAFTA endorsement). For further discussion of the NAALC labor rights system, see generally
Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S. HemisphericLabor Rights Policy Under GSP
and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337 (1995); Jackson, supra note 35, at 32-56.
52. Although the first such trade agreement, NAFTA is not the first international agreement
between the United States and Mexico relating to worker rights. The Bracero Treaty, which was first
adopted in 1942, established a foreign guestworker program allowing the importation of Mexican
agricultural workers into the United States, conditioned on certain labor protections. See Agreement
Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting the Temporary Migration of Mexican
Agricultural Workers, Aug. 4, 1942, U.S.-Mex., 56 Stat. 1759. Approximately 400,000 Mexicans
were employed in the United States under the Bracero program in its heyday in the late 1950s. See
Richard Louv, Mexican Migration Story of Hope and Pain: Hospitality Parallels Hostility, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Mar. 16, 1986, at Al.
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(minimum wages and overtime pay); (7) nondiscrimination in employment;
(8) equal pay for men and women; (9) occupational health and safety; (10)
worker compensation; and (11) protection of migrant workers 3 No min-
imum acceptable standards are set forth in the NAALC, and member states
are obligated to promote these principles through their own labor laws "to
the maximum extent possible. "' The interpretation of these rights is not
expressly tied to ILO standards.
NAALC oversight emphasizes collaboration, and the enforcement
structure is much weaker than that in Europe. Alleged violations of the
NAALC are not subject to judicial review, but they can be considered pur-
suant to a three-tier administrative investigation and enforcement process.
Oversight of the first three rights covered by the NAALC (freedom of
association and the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and
the right to strike) is limited to consultation among the appropriate
ministers. Violations of the five labor standards relating to forced labor,
employment discrimination, equal pay, worker compensation, and migrant
workers are subject to both ministerial consultation and consideration by
the multilateral Evaluation Committee of Experts. Actual sanctions can be
imposed only to enforce the norms relating to occupational health and
safety, child labor, and minimum wage standards, and then only if a nation
has established a "persistent pattern" of nonenforcement.5 Like the ILO,
the NAALC Council and Secretariat promote regional cooperation and pub-
lish reports on various labor-related issues. Member governments also
must maintain a National Administrative Office (NAO) within their labor
ministries to gather and share information and to receive public communi-
cations on labor issues.56 To date, a number of labor petitions have been
filed under the NAALC, most notably alleging Mexico's violations of the
right to freedom of association and, more recently, of gender discrimina-
tion in the workplace.' The petitions have resulted in reviews of various
Mexican and U.S. practices, although no sanctions have been imposed. 8
53. See NAALC, supra note 51, Annex 1, at 1515-16.
54. Id. art. 1, at 1503.
55. Id. art. 27, at 1509. For further discussion of the NAALC review process, see generally
Murphy, supra note 51, at 407-15.
56. See NAALC, supra note 51, arts. 5, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1504-07.
57. In response to a NAALC complaint filed by Human Rights Watch and other American and
Mexican human rights and labor groups, the U.S. Labor Department recently investigated claims of
sex discrimination in the maquiladora industries at the U.S.-Mexican border. The Department found
that many of the 2,700 maquiladora plants, most of which are U.S.-owned, fire or force the resignation
of pregnant women workers. Based on this investigation, the Labor Department requested consultation
with Mexico. See Sam Dillon, Sex Bias at Border Plants in Mexico Reported by U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1998, at A6. Whether or not the practice violates the NAALC will turn on whether Mexico's
domestic labor code prohibits such discrimination.
58. See Lance A. Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights
Regime Takes Shape, 3 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 159, 178 (1995) (arguing that the NAO's review process
produces benefits for labor rights, despite the lack of sanctions); Jackson, supra note 35, at 49-56
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Despite the NAALC's prominence as the United States's first inter-
national trade and labor agreement, the accord has been a lightning rod for
criticism from both free trade and labor rights advocates. Free trade pro-
ponents fear any expansion of the labor rights protections under the side
accord and oppose its replication in future trade agreements. Labor
unions, on the other hand, have criticized the NAALC for lacking suffi-
cient independence and enforcement authority to be effective. 9 In
particular, labor critics point to the limited availability of sanctions under
the agreement and to the absence of any impetus for improvement or
harmonization of labor standards in the member states. Whatever the mer-
its of these criticisms, it is clear that the NAALC's primary contribution
to the transnational labor rights regime to date has been to create a forum
for regional public awareness of labor rights issues. As Lance Compa, co-
editor of Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade and the for-
mer Director of Labor Law and Economic Research at the NAALC
Secretariat, explains elsewhere, the NAO review process has "forced the
companies and the government to review their own actions and to have
subordinate officials explain their decisions to superiors."' Graciela
Areous concurs that "the greater transparency which is likely to ensue by
making each country's compliance with the labor laws in force a trinational
issue, could well contribute to discouraging those management strategies
that violate workers' rights in their efforts to adapt to new economic
circumstances."61 Despite its limitations, then, the NAALC stands as a
groundbreaking step toward regional collaboration in the development and
oversight of labor rights.
C. Domestic Enforcement of the Transnational Regime
Given the limited availability of multilateral enforcement mechanisms
outside the EU, unilateral enforcement by leading trading nations can play
an important role in giving teeth to the international labor rights system.
Despite its persistent unwillingness to ratify ILO conventions, the United
States has been a leader in tying its trade and foreign assistance laws to
(evaluating the NAALC dispute resolution process); Murphy, supra note 51, at 415-18 (discussing the
conclusion drawn by the United States's NAO that "it was 'not in a position to make a finding that the
Government of Mexico failed to enforce the relevant labor laws'" to protect the rights of workers at
Honeywell and General Electric subsidiaries in Mexico (quoting U.S. NAT'L ADMIN. OFFICE, PUBLIC
REPORT OF REVIEw 28)).
59. See AFL-CIO TASK FORCE ON TRADE, NAFTA ACTION SOURCE BOOK 7 (1993); Richard
Aim, Union Leaders UpsetAfterLabor Complaints onMexico Shunned, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
14, 1994, at ID.
60. Compa, supra note 58, at 178.
61. Graciela Bensusin Areous, The Mexican Model of Labor Regulation and Competitive
Strategies, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA 52, 59 (Maria
Lorena Cook & Harry C. Katz eds., 1994).
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compliance with internationally recognized worker rights. Voluntary social
labeling schemes and corporate codes of conduct, and nascent efforts at
litigating international labor rights in domestic courts, round out the United
States's contribution to the transnational labor rights regime.
1. United States Trade Laws.-Within the United States, efforts to
promote international labor rights have gained strength even as the mem-
bership of the U.S. labor movement has waned. In the past fifteen years,
a number of U.S. statutes relating to international trade and investment
have been amended to condition the granting of benefits on compliance
with international labor rights. 2 The most notable of these statutes is the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) established under the 1974 Trade
Act.63 In 1984, the GSP was amended to require that the President with-
hold GSP trading privileges from any country that "has not taken or is not
taking steps to afford [its workers] internationally recognized worker
rights."' 4 "[I]nternationally recognized labor rights" are defined as (1)
freedom of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain effectively; (3)
freedom from forced labor; (4) freedom from child labor; and (5) mini-
mum employment conditions (minimum wages, hours of work, and occupa-
tional safety and health). 65 With the exception of the prohibition on
discrimination in employment (which the GSP statute does not include),
these rights mirror those recognized by the ILO as fundamental. The stat-
ute does not expressly incorporate ILO standards with respect to these
rights, although the U.S. State Department interprets the rights in light of
the applicable ILO conventions and publishes information relating to labor
rights compliance in its annual Country Reports.'6
Trade and investment laws with similar provisions include the
Caribbean Basin Initiative,67 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
62. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WORKER RIGHTS UNDER THE U.S. TRADE
LAWS (1989) [hereinafter LAWYER COMMITTEE]; Ian Charles Ballon, The Implications of Making the
Denial of Internationally Recognized Worker Rights Actionable Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 73-74 (1987) (listing congressional action requiring consideration of "a
country's internal labor practices before granting the country beneficiary status"). See generally
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
63. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(1)-(6) (1994).
64. Id. § 2462(b)(7).
65. See id. § 2462(a)(2).
66. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, APPENDIX B TO COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1997 (1998), available in (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/
human rightsl1997_hrp report/appendb.htmI >(defining the right to freedom of association, protection
against forced or compulsory labor, and the right to acceptable conditions of work in terms of ILO
conventions).
67. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (1994) (requiring considera-
tion of whether workers have "reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to organize and
bargain collectively" in extending duty-free status to 27 Caribbean nations).
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Act (OPIC),68 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988.69 Since 1994, federal law has required U.S. delegates to the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international lending
programs under the International Financial Institution to use their "voice
and vote" to press borrowing countries to guarantee internationally recog-
nized worker rights as set forth in the GSP and relevant ILO
conventions.7 Clauses conditioning benefits on labor rights compliance
are included in the Andean Trade Preference Act7' and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency.' After revelations that the U.S. Agency
for International Development (AID) was providing funding to help com-
panies in Central America blacklist union activists, the AID statute was
amended to prohibit any foreign aid that "contributes to the violation" of
worker rights. 3
In contrast to the ILO and NAFTA systems, many of the domestic
trade and investment laws do provide for the imposition of sanctions
against countries whose labor practices are deemed insufficient. Benefits
to a number of countries have been canceled, withheld, or suspended pur-
suant to these provisions.74  The U.S. State Department's annual
68. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985,22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1)
(1994) (denying governmental protection for U.S. investors in countries that are not "taking steps to
... extend internationally recognized worker rights" to their workers).
69. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d) (1994) (defining a
country's systematic denial of internationally recognized worker rights as an unreasonable trade practice
warranting the withholding or denial of trade preferences).
70. See Foreign Appropriations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 22
U.S.C. § 26 2p-4 p (1994); see also Lance Compa, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Association
of Law Schools (Jan. 7, 1995), in 17 COMP. LAB. L. 338, 360 (1996); Conference, Recent
Development: The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: Linking Labor Standards and
Rights to Trade Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 815 (1997).
71. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3205 (1994) (applying Caribbean Basin Initiative labor rights provisions
to trade with the Andean region).
72. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Standard Contract of Guarantee and General
Conditions of Guarantee for Equity Investments, Oct. 11, 1985, 101 Stat. 1329, 28 I.L.M. 1233
(entered into force Apr. 12, 1988) (codified as amended in 22 U.S.C. §§ 290k to 290k-11) (requiring
U.S. representatives to encourage labor rights protections as a requirement for obtaining international
investment insurance).
73. Foreign Assistance Programs of the United States Agency for International Development, 22
U.S.C. § 2151 (1994); see also Compa, supra note 51, at 340 n.14 (discussing the amendment to the
AID statute and other trade and investment laws).
74. See Recent Changes in the GSP Program (visited Mar. 11, 1998) <http://www.ustr.gov/
reports/gsp/changes.html>. Presidents have used GSP benefits to sanction or reward countries for
their efforts to meet internationally accepted worker rights. See Proclamation No. 6942, 3 C.F.R. 94,
95-96 (1997) (suspending Pakistan partially in 1996); Proclamation No. 6813, 3 C.F.R. 61, 62-63
(1996) (suspending the Maldives in 1995); Proclamation No. 6575, 3 C.F.R. 65, 66 (1994), reprinted
in 107 Stat. 2675, 2676 (1993) (suspending Mauritania in 1993); Proclamation No. 6447, 3 C.F.R.
107, 108 (1993), reprinted in 106 Stat. 5320, 5321 (1992) (suspending Syria in 1992); Proclamation
No. 6245, 3 C.F.R. 7, 7-9 (1992), reprinted in 105 Stat. 2484, 2484-86 (1991) (restoring Paraguay
and the Central African Republic); Proclamation No. 6244, 3 C.F.R. 5, 5-6 (1992), reprinted in 105
Stat. 2482, 2482-83 (1991) (restoring Chile); Proclamation No. 6123, 3 C.F.R. 52, 53-55 (1991),
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investigation and reporting of labor rights conditions, pursuant to these
provisions, also plays an important domestic role in the mobilization of
shame against egregious labor rights violators.
In addition to the general trade, foreign assistance, and investment
laws discussed above, country-specific statutes help to ensure respect for
international worker rights by restricting foreign investment in, or the
importation of products from, certain countries that engage in repressive
human rights practices. In April 1997, for example, President Clinton
imposed a ban on new U.S. investment in Burma pursuant to the 1996
Cohen-Feinstein law,75 which mandates sanctions if the Burmese military
government engages in "large scale repression" against political
dissidents.76 In the fall of 1997, President Clinton signed a ban on the
importation of goods made by bonded child labor, although Congress
appropriated no additional Customs Service funds for its enforcement.77
Indeed, proposed legislation sanctioning foreign nations or imposing trade
barriers on foreign goods produced by child or forced labor has become
vogue. More than nine other such bills were introduced in Congress
during 1997.7"
reprinted in 104 Stat. 5252, 5253-55 (1990) (suspending Liberia in 1990); Proclamation No. 5955, 3
C.F.R. 29, 29-31 (1990), reprinted in 103 Stat. 3010, 3011-13 (1989) (suspending Burma and the
Central African Republic in 1989); Proclamation No. 5758, 3 C.F.R. 187, 187-88 (1988), reprinted
in 102 Stat. 4941 (1988) (suspending Chile in 1988); Proclamation No. 5617, 3 C.F.R. 26, 26-27
(1988), reprinted in 101 Stat. 2086, 2086-87 (1987) (removing Romania and Nicaragua and suspending
Paraguay in 1987). In 1993, the United States placed El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Thailand,
Malawi, and Oman on "six-month continuing review status" to determine whether the countries made
"substantial concrete progress" toward addressing worker rights, see Gadbaw & Medwig, supra note
13, at 148. OPIC has suspended insurance programs in Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, Chile, the
Central African Republic, and Ethiopia at least in part as a result of labor rights practices. See id.,
supra note 13, at 149.
75. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 208, § 570(b), 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-166 (1996).
76. Steven Erlanger, Clinton Approves New U.S. Sanctions Against Burmese, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 1997, at Al.
77. See Julie V. lovine, Must-Have Label, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at Fl.
78. The Laogai Slave Labor Products Bill, H.R. 2195, 105th Cong. (1997), which appropriated
funds for U.S. customs personnel to monitor the importation of products made with forced labor, was
adopted by the House on November 5, 1997, by a vote of 419 to 2, with one abstention. See 143
CONG. REC. HI0,093 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997). Related legislation that was offered during 1997
includes: Chinese Slave Labor Act, H.R. 320, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting the importation of
goods from China that were made with forced labor); Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1997, H.R. 1328,
105th Cong. (prohibiting the importation of goods produced with child labor); Child Labor Deterrence
Act of 1997, S. 332, 105th Cong.; H.R. 1634 (declaring that U.S. corporations doing business in China
or Tibet should suspend their use of merchandise produced by forced labor); H.R. 2085, 105th Cong.
(1997) (prohibiting the Export-Import Bank from guaranteeing or extending credit to Chinese export
entities that fail to adhere to fair employment principles under a corporate code of conduct); Bonded
Child Labor Elimination Act, H.R. 2475, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting the importation of goods
produced with bonded child labor); International Child Labor Elimination Act of 1997, H.R. 2677,
105th Cong. (prohibiting the importation of goods produced with child labor, and barring foreign assis-
tance to countries in which child labor is used); International Child Labor Elimination Act of 1997,
H.R. 2678, 105th Cong. (prohibiting foreign assistance to countries in which child labor is used).
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Unilateral enforcement of the labor rights regime through U.S. laws
that are not expressly tied to ILO standards has provoked criticism by
Philip Alston and others that U.S. trade linkage is a rogue system which
undermines the effort to develop universal labor standards. 9 Unilateral
trade restrictions also may conflict with U.S. obligations under the
antidiscrimination provisions of the GATT, such as the "National
Treatment" provision,' which has been construed by the WTO as prohib-
iting countries from differentiating among foreign products based on
methods of production that do not affect the product's character." Such
shortcomings aside, however, domestic trade laws pose a potentially val-
uable means for nations to encourage compliance with fundamental labor
rights.
2. Private Corporate Codes of Conduct and Social Labeling.-In the
private sector, the past decade has also seen a dramatic increase in the
development of voluntary "codes of conduct" and "social labeling"
schemes by multinational corporations and industries to guide their
economic activities abroad. Private codes of conduct draw inspiration from
international instruments such as the United Nations Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations,'a the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,83 and
79. See Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law. "Aggressive Unilateralism"'?,
in Pp. 71, 79 (discussing the need to use "irreproachable legal methods" in requiring countries to
comply with international labor standards).
80. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI), Oct. 30, 1947, pt. I, art. lII, 61 Stat. at
A-18, A-19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204-08 (prohibiting member states from applying non-tariff trade barriers
or regulations to foreign goods "so as to afford protection to domestic production"). "Most-Favored
Nation" (MFN) obligations under the GATT similarly require that any trade advantage afforded a
specific foreign product must be immediately extended to all "like" products from other member states.
Id. pt. I, art. I, 61 Stat. at A-12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-200.
81. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from Mexico, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 155, 205 (1993) (holding that U.S. import restrictions based on the method used to harvest
foreign tuna violated GATT rules); see also LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 62, at 66 ("Without an
internationally recognized basis on which to impose trade sanctions, any United States action under
Section 301 to address the denial of worker rights by a fellow signatory would appear to constitute a
substantive violation of GATT's MFN clause, or at least a procedural evasion of GATT's dispute
resolution mechanism."). The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which the OECD has been
negotiating since 1995, may pose similar obstacles to domestic efforts to link labor rights and inter-
national investment. For a draft of this agreement, see Multilateral Agreement on Investment (last
modified Feb. 20, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org>. Negotiations on the agreement are scheduled for
completion in May 1998.
82. In the early 1970s, the United Nations developed a Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations, which would obligate multinational corporations to respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the countries in which they operate. The Code was never formally adopted. See Lance
A. Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe Darricarrbre, Private Labor Rights Enforcement Through Corporate
Codes of Conduct, in Pp. 181, 183-84 (discussing the U.N. code).
83. See Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy, 61 INT'L LAB. OFF. OFFICIAL BULL. 49 (1978) (Series A). The ILO guidelines for multi-
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the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,' 4 as well as the
"Sullivan Principles," a voluntary anti-apartheid code of conduct promoted
for U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa.' Development of
the modem codes of corporate conduct has been spurred by public outcry
over exploitative labor conditions abroad, such as the controversies sur-
rounding Wal-Mart's Kathie Lee Gifford clothing line,' 6 and overseas
operations of the Nike CorporationY The voluntary codes are intended
to ensure that a corporation's foreign business practices, as well as those
of its foreign subsidiaries and suppliers, are consistent with basic interna-
tional human and labor rights. Such codes have now been adopted by
more than a hundred companies, primarily producers of consumer goods
such as Levi-Strauss, Reebok, Gap, Nike, Sears, JCPenney, Wal-Mart,
Home Depot, and Philips Van-Heusen, whose operations are highly suscep-
tible to public expos6s of labor abuses.88
Corporate codes of conduct vary widely in their scope, detail, and
particularly in their provisions for monitoring activities and compelling
compliance. The Nike Corporation, for example, has been the object of
much recent criticism both for the conditions in its Indonesian, Chinese,
and Vietnamese plants, and for the apparently self-serving and ineffectual
nature of its internal monitoring process. 9 Levi-Strauss, on the other
hand, has a fairly elaborate structure for auditing, evaluating, and enforc-
ing its code terms, and by 1994 had withdrawn operations from two coun-
tries (China and Burma), terminated contracts with thirty of its worldwide
suppliers, and forced reforms of the employment practices of over one
national corporations include a complaint system for raising labor rights violations, but they do not
provide for the imposition of sanctions.
84. OECD, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 1 (1994).
85. The principles were substantially incorporated into legislation by the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (repealed 1994).
86. See Michael Posner & Lynda Clarizio, An Unprecedented Step in the Effort to End
Sweatshops, HUM. RTS., Fall 1997, at 14; Stephanie Strom, A Sweetheart Becomes Suspect: Looking
Behind Those Kathie Lee Labels, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996, at D1.
87. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
88. See Compa & Darricarrre, supra note 82, at 186-87, 193; Posner & Clarizio, supra note 86,
at 15.
89. See Dana Canedy, Nike's Asian Factories Pass Young's Muster, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997,
at D2 (reporting that human rights groups contend that by hiring Andrew Young to investigate overseas
labor practices, Nike was trying to deflect accusations that its foreign subcontractors subject workers
to sweatshop conditions); Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam Is Called Unsafe For
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at Al (reporting that Ernst & Young's investigation of Nike
plants in January 1997 found that workers were required to work 65 hours per week, for $10 a week,
and were exposed to carcinogens at 177 times local legal standards); Bob Herbert, Nike's Boot Camps,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A15 (describing Nike's Vietnam factories as "'military boot camps'
in which workers are subjected to various forms of humiliation and corporal punishment"); Editorial,
Watching the Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1997, at A22 (criticizing Young's investigation of
Nike factories for scheduling visits in advance and using Nike translators).
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hundred others." The Gap has allowed local religious, labor, and human
rights groups to monitor a contractor plant in San Salvador, a move that
resulted in promising improvements in plant conditions.91 Liz Claiborne
recently announced that it will begin opening its Guatemalan factories to
inspection by independent local monitors,' and Ikea and the Pottery Barn
periodically hire outside agents to monitor overseas carpet looms for child
labor.'
Industry-wide and regional codes of conduct are being developed as
well. Concerns about sweatshop conditions and exploitation in the clothing
and footwear industries led President Clinton to convene the Apparel
Industry Partnership in the fall of 1996. The Partnership, which is com-
posed of industry representatives, unions, and advocacy groups, has devel-
oped an interim Workplace Code of Conduct for the apparel industry,
which sets minimum standards for child labor, forced labor, workplace
discrimination, and working hours.' The Partnership has proposed
internal and external monitoring standards and plans to create an
independent association to oversee compliance with the code.95
Ultimately the Partnership intends to develop a "No Sweat" labeling system
to identify for consumers products that were produced under conditions
90. See Compa & Darricarr re, supra note 82, at 187-90.
91. See Citizen Shell, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A10; Watching the Sweatshops, supra note
89.
92. See Watching the Sweatshops, supra note 89. The announcementfollowed reports by a watch-
dog organization that one of Liz Claiborne's Honduran factories employed 13-year-old children working
12-hour days, and paid the workers 65 cents to make a sweater that sold in the U.S. for $90. See id.
93. See lovine, supra note 77 (quoting a Pottery Barn official as saying that "child labor is an
issue that we cannot afford to be associated with").
94. See Posner & Clarizio, supra note 86, at 14-15. Specifically, the code requires participating
companies to pledge to provide abuse-free factories, to hire children fifteen years of age or older (or
14 years of age or older in countries allowing child labor below age 15), to limit the workweek to 60
hours, to protect the right of workers to organize without fear of retaliation, and to pay the local mini-
mum wage. The code calls for companies to hire independent monitors, which can include company-
designated accounting firms, and requests that the monitors work with local human rights, labor, and
religious groups. See, e.g., A Modest Start on Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at A22
(identifying the primary features and faults of the code); Steven Greenhouse, Accord to Combat
Sweatshop Labor Faces Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Greenhouse,
Accord] (expressing labor and human rights groups' concern that outside monitors be independent
enough to point out and publicize violations). Labor and human rights groups failed to reach an agree-
ment with the Partnership to ban all child labor below age fifteen, to impose a 48-hour workweek, and
to require local independentmonitoring and payment of a living wage. See Greenhouse, Accord, supra;
Steven Greenhouse, Voluntary Rules on Apparel Labor Prove Hard to Set, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997,
§ 1, at 1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Voluntary Rules]. The living wage issue was considered particularly
important for workers in countries such as Vietnam, Haiti, and Indonesia, where the legal minimum
wage can be as low as 27 cents per hour, well below subsistence levels. See A Modest Start on
Sweatshops, supra (discussing Vietnam); Greenhouse, Voluntary Rules, supra (discussing Haiti and
Indonesia).
95. See Posner & Clarizio, supra note 86, at 14.
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free from child or prison labor or other substandard conditions.96 Thus,
the group hopes to utilize market incentives to encourage industry com-
pliance with the voluntary regime. 97
Monitoring difficulties with the Partnership and other corporate codes
remain. Internal monitoring by companies may smell of the fox minding
the chicken coop, and serious questions arise regarding the extent to which
code violations will be disclosed to the public or affect a company's ability
to utilize the "No Sweat" labels. 98 Labeling programs also run the risk
that goods will be fraudulently mislabeled as "child-" or "sweat-free."
Accordingly, legislation was introduced in Congress last spring which
would have authorized the United States Department of Labor to develop
voluntary child-labor-free labeling standards, to maintain a list of com-
panies that made exemplary progress toward ensuring they did not use
child labor, and to sanction fraudulent labeling practices.' In short, as
Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade authors Compa and
Derricarr~re note, given the variety of resources available from the ILO
and elsewhere, drafting a workable corporate code of conduct or labeling
scheme for an industry is a relatively easy task. Whether or not the codes
96. See Greenhouse, Accord, supra note 94.
97. Other industry-wide efforts include the Toy Manufacturers of America, which adopted a
limited code of conduct regarding forced and child labor, and the Federation International of Football
Associations, which adopted a strong labor code for soccer ball manufacturers following stories that
80% of the world's soccer balls were produced in Pakistan, often by child and bonded labor. See
Robin Broad & John Cavanaugh, Checking It Once, Checking It Twice: Making Sure Child Labor Is
off Your Christmas List, WASH. PosT, Dec. 8, 1996, at C5.
Such efforts also are not limited to the United States. "Rugmark," a child-labor carpet labeling
effort in India and Nepal that was originally funded by the German government, has been in operation
since 1994 with promising results. The Foundation is comprised of campaigners against child labor,
consumer groups, carpet manufacturers, the London-based Anti-Slavery International, UNICEF, and
other international organizations. Rugmark oversees a voluntary program whereby carpet exporters
can mark their carpets as child-labor free, operates shelters and schools for rescued child workers, and
monitors production by exporters using the label. One percent of the price paid by foreign importers
goes toward assisting rescued children. To date, Rugmark has issued 144 export licenses, covering
nearly 500,000 exported carpets, and has pulled licenses from 174 looms that were found to be
employing children illegally. See Mukul Sharma, Slaves of the Looms Escape to Rediscover Childhood,
SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Feb. 8, 1998. Here again, monitoring of the widely dispersed looms remains
the largest concern, with critics pointing out that "[liabels can and will be bought." See Iovine, supra
note 77 (discussing criticisms of rug labeling efforts); see also Molly Moore, Factories of Children:
Youth Labor Force Growing in Asia to Meet Export Demand, Help Families, WASH. POST, May 21,
1995, at Al (noting that carpet manufacturers have responded to child labor inquests by moving work
from large factories to smaller loom owners and subcontractors in villages accessible only "by foot or
bullock cart"); Christopher Thomas, Drive to Ban Child Labour Makes India's Poor Poorer, TIMEs
(London), Feb. 3, 1996 (describing the difficulty in monitoring a cottage industry in which carpet
production is carried out in thousands of mud houses across northern India), available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, NON-US File.
98. Greenhouse, Accord, supra note 94; see also Bob Herbert, A Good Start, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 1997, at A17 (discussing obstacles to successful monitoring under the code).
99. See Child Labor Free Consumer Information Act of 1997, S. 554, 105th Cong.; Child Labor
Free Consumer Information Act of 1997, H.R. 1301, 105th Cong.
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of conduct and social labeling efforts will be backed up by credible
auditing and enforcement regimes remains to be seen.' °
3. Litigating Compliance with the Labor Regime.-Domestic litigation
is also playing an increasingly important role in the definition and enforce-
ment of the transnational human and labor rights regime. Although labor
rights have not been a traditional focus of such litigation, the past decade
has seen initial, tentative efforts at enforcing international worker rights
through the U.S. courts. The authors of Human Rights, Labor Rights, and
International Trade discuss three such suits: one in which U.S. labor
organizations sought to compel U.S. compliance with the GSP labor rights
provisions and two in which foreign workers sought damages for a breach
of a foreign collective bargaining contract and for toxic chemical exposure.
In International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund v.
Bush,'"' labor and human rights groups brought an Administrative
Procedure Act challenge to the Bush administration's enforcement of the
GSP labor provisions. In essence, the plaintiff organizations claimed that
the administration had acted arbitrarily and in violation of the GSP statute
by continuing to extend trading privileges to countries such as Malaysia,
despite well-documented evidence of labor abuses. The district court dis-
missed the suit as nonjusticiable, finding that the vague wording of the GSP
statute committed labor rights determinations to agency discretion and
yielded "no law" for the court to apply. 2 The decision was affirmed
on appeal in a per curiam opinion with separate concurrences from Judge
Henderson, who would have dismissed the action on the grounds that
the Court of International Trade had exclusive jurisdiction over the
claims,0 3 and Judge Sentelle, who would have held that the labor union
and human rights organization plaintiffs lacked standing."° Judge Mikva
dissented, finding that the labor unions had standing and that the statute
imposed a mandatory duty on the executive that was subject to judicial
review.' 05
In Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc.,"
employees of the Pico Korea Corporation sued to enforce their collective
100. See Compa & Darricarr~re, supra note 82, at 194.
101. 752 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Terry
Collingsworth, International Worker Rights Enforcement: Proposals Following a Test Case, in Pp. 227,
228.
102. International Labor Rights Educ. and Research Fund, 752 F. Supp. at 497.
103. See International Labor Rights Educ. and Research Fund, 954 F.2d 745, 747-48 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Henderson, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 749-52 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
105. See id. at 754-59 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
106. 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992). See generally Frank E. Deale, The Pico Case: Testing
International Labor Rights in U.S. Courts, in P. 251.
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bargaining agreement against the U.S.-based parent corporation, Pico
Products, Inc. (Pico). The suit, which was filed in the Northern District
of New York, alleged that Pico Products had tortiously interfered with the
workers' contract by forcing the shutdown of the Korean corporation, in
violation of the workers' collective bargaining agreement. The trial court
denied Pico's motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens,
finding that Pico Korea had been dissolved and no longer was subject to
suit in the Korean courts."° At trial, however, the court ruled for the
defendants, finding that the workers had failed to demonstrate that the
parent corporation could be held liable under New York law.0 8
Finally, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro,'" banana workers
employed by the Standard Fruit Company in Costa Rica successfully sued
the Dow Chemical Corporation in Texas state court for torts arising from
the workers' exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a highly toxic
pesticide used in banana production. The pesticide was known to cause
infertility in men; it had been banned by the Environmental Protection
Agency in the United States, and Dow previously had been held liable to
California workers for millions in damages due to DBCP-related sterility.
Nevertheless, Dow had continued exporting DBCP to Costa Rica without
any effort to inform workers of the risks of exposure. Like the Pico
defendants, Dow sought dismissal based on forum non conveniens, a
motion which, if successful, effectively would have precluded the workers
from suing in any forum."l 0 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this
defense, however, and in 1992 the case settled with a substantial recovery
for the plaintiff workers."' Following the Castro Alfaro settlement,
approximately twenty-five thousand other suits were filed in Texas and
Louisiana between 1993 and 1995 on behalf of sterilized banana workers
in twelve countries. Many of these cases have been partially settled by
chemical company defendants and are still pending against banana
companies."12
107. See Deale, supra note 106, at 257.
108. See id. at 258.
109. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990). See generally Emily Yozell, The Castro Alfaro Case:
Convenience and Justice-Lessons for Lawyers in Transcultural Litigation, in P. 273.
110. See Dow Chemical, 786 S.W.2d at 683 (Doggett, J., concurring) (criticizing the defendants'
use of forum non conveniens in their effort to escape liability). The court ultimately held that Texas
has statutorily abolished the forum non conveniens defense. Id. at 679.
111. See Costa Rica: The Price of Bananas, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at 48 (reporting
that a suit by approximately 800 workers is believed to have settled for a total of $20 million, with
distributions to individual workers ranging from $1500 to $15,000).
112. See Interview with Emily Yozell (Feb. 12, 1998); see also Jim Gomez, Pesticide Fund Pays
Filipino Workers, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 12, 1997, at 2 (reporting that 13,000 agricul-
tural workers worldwide are eligible to receive payments from a $41.5 million fund resulting from the
settlement of DBCP claims against U.S. chemical companies). As a result of the Castro Alfaro
litigation, the Texas legislature adopted a new forum non conveniens statute designed to limit the ability
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The Bhopal environmental disaster litigation also bears mentioning
here. Following the tragic leak of methyl isocyanate gas from the Union
Carbide pesticide factory in Bhopal, India in December 1984, private plain-
tiffs and the Indian government sued Union Carbide in the Southern
District of New York, seeking damages on a state law tort theory. The
plaintiffs attempted to pierce the corporate veil and establish liability over
the U.S. parent corporation under a theory of "multinational enterprise
liability," arguing that the parent corporation, which controlled a majority
interest in the Indian subsidiary, had a nondelegable duty to assure that the
subsidiary's hazardous activities did not cause harm."1 3 Neither the tort
claims nor the parental liability issues were addressed on the merits. The
district court dismissed the suit on grounds of forum non conveniens, in a
decision which was largely upheld on appeal."
4
These cases illustrate some of the formidable obstacles that confront
transnational labor suits in U.S. courts, including the doctrines of standing,
forum non conveniens, piercing the corporate veil, executive deference,
and personal and subject matter jurisdiction. As authors Terry
Collingsworth, Frank Deale, and Emily Yozell repeatedly note, such suits
can be extremely expensive, may involve difficult attorney-client relations,
and may present unfamiliar issues of international law to potentially hostile
courts. Nevertheless, the cases also suggest that positive results can be
of foreign claimants to bring personal injury suits in Texas courts for injuries arising outside of the
jurisdiction. SEE TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (Vernon 1997). See Terrence Stutz,
Senate OKs Limits on Product Liability, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 29, 1993, at 36A (reporting
that business interests have been trying since 1990 to reverse the Texas Supreme Court's Castro Alfaro
ruling).
113. For a discussion of the Bhopal case, see Koh, supra note 9, at 2369-70; see also INDIAN LAW
INST., MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL CASE (Upendra Baxi et al.
eds., 1986) (collecting the pleadings, motions, and briefs from the Bhopal case); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for International Settlement, 20
TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 326-27 (1985) (proposing a multinational responsibility theory for the manage-
ment of subsidiary companies in developing countries).
114. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs opposed
dismissal due to forum non conveniens on the grounds that they were entitled to deference in choice
of forum, that Indian courts and Indian law were insufficiently equipped to deal with the mass tort, that
Union Carbide's principal place of business was the United States, and that the most probative evidence
regarding Union Carbide's negligence and causation were located in the United States. See In re Union
Carbide, 809 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1987). The court found that suit in India was more appropriate,
among other reasons, because (1) the plaintiffs were foreign nationals; (2) India provided an adequate
alternative forum; (3) Indian courts were better able to construe applicable Indian law; (4) wimesses
and sources of proof were located almost entirely in India; (5) relevant parts of the Bhopal plant were
manufactured in India; (6) plant records were almost entirely in Hindi or other Indian languages; and
(7) the Indian government (which had chosen the U.S. forum) had a greater interest than the United
States in enforcing its laws and regulations and in adjudicating the victims' claims. See id. at 202-03;
In re Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 845-47, 859-67. Based on these considerations, the Second
Circuit held that "it might reasonably be concluded that it would have been an abuse of discretion to
deny a forum non conveniens dismissal." In re Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 202 (emphasis omitted).
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achieved, whether in the form of monetary damages, an annunciation of
human or labor rights norms, or by publicizing the workers' cause and
marshalling moral opprobrium at the violation.
II. Two Challenges for the Labor Rights Regime
The picture that emerges from the discussion above is of a surprising
ferment of activity in the transnational labor rights regime. Where barely
a decade ago the ILO stood as an isolated and, in many minds, ossified
monument to the goal of an international labor system, a growing consen-
sus now has emerged that at least certain worker rights can be considered
fundamental. Basic prohibitions against forced labor and sex discrimina-
tion in the workplace, and respect for freedom of association and the right
to collective bargaining are incorporated in nearly every major instrument
in the transnational labor rights regime, from ILO conventions and human
rights instruments, to the provisions of NAFTA and the EU, to U.S. trade
laws and private codes of conduct for corporations. As oversight and sanc-
tioning mechanisms proliferate, enforcement of these protections has
become a reality, and states and corporations no longer can conduct busi-
ness impervious to the human and labor rights contexts in which they
operate.
Nevertheless, two fundamental challenges continue to face the global
community: (1) whether universal agreement can be reached on the defini-
tion of relative rights such as child labor, minimum wages, and working
conditions; and (2) whether global enforcement should be promoted
through direct linkage of trade and worker rights.
A. Defining Relative Rights
As noted in Part I, the ILO's fundamental conventions relating to
freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively,
forced labor, equal pay, and workplace discrimination have received broad
international support (outside the United States), with well over a hundred
nations acceding to their terms. Other rights, however, such as a minimum
wage, the prohibition of child labor, and occupational health and safety
conditions, are sufficiently contingent on the stage of a country's economy,
and thus sufficiently controversial, that it is difficult to formulate any
universally acceptable norm.
The reasons for the difficulty in achieving universal definition and
acceptance of these rights are readily apparent. With respect to child
labor, for example, in countries such as India, Nepal, and Pakistan,
unemployment is widespread, educational opportunities are minimal or
nonexistent, and large portions of the population scrape an existence out of
the informal or subsistence economies. Under such conditions, child labor
15571998]
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is a necessity of life. Families and children have few viable alternatives,
and the enforcement of any prohibition is correspondingly difficult." 5
In this context, efforts by well-meaning nations to prohibit all child labor
through the age of fourteen or fifteen at best appear foolishly naive and
misguided. At worst, they can result in children being thrown from carpet
looms to much worse fates in gangs and urban brothels.' 16 Similarly, a
"universal" minimum wage set at a specific monetary level will never be
appropriate,1 7 and health and safety conditions considered minimally
acceptable in some regions or industries will be unfathomable luxuries in
others, so long as the extreme global disparity in wages and living condi-
tions remains.
On the other hand, allowing corporations to benefit economically from
grossly substandard working conditions is equally inappropriate, harms the
workers they employ, and may reasonably be considered an unfair trade
practice. Thus, the effort to both allow for necessary relativism in
conditions, while discouraging truly exploitative practices, remains a pri-
mary challenge for the labor rights regime.
Fortunately, some creative proposals are being made on this front.
The ILO and other organizations have been working for many years to
develop recommendations and interpretations of minimum wages and
working conditions that are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the needs
of developing economies." 8 As the U.S. State Department explains,
[d]ifferences in.. . economic development are taken into account in
the formulation of internationally recognized labor standards
[regarding acceptable conditions of work]. For example, many ILO
standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their
scope and coverage. They may also permit countries a wide choice
in their implementation, including progressive implementation, by
enabling countries to accept a standard in part or subject to specified
exceptions. Countries are expected to take steps over time to achieve
the higher levels specified in such standards. It should be
understood, however, that this flexibility applies only to
internationally recognized standards concerning working conditions.
No flexibility is permitted concerning the acceptance of the basic
principles contained in human rights standards, i.e., freedom of
115. See Moore, supra note 97 (describing the economic plight of families in the northern Indian
state of Bihar).
116. See BrEN, supra note 2, at 316 (noting that child labor legislation may lead to a movement
of child labor from the formal to the informal sectors of the economy).
117. See, e.g., id. at 206 ("The right to fair wages cannot be regulated in international law in any
detailed and precise way.").
118. See id. at 208-10 (discussing ILO efforts at obtaining an international consensus regarding
a minimum wage).
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association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, the
prohibition of forced labor, and the absence of discrimination.
1 1 9
In this vein, the European Social Charter Committee of Experts has defined
a "decent standard of living" for the EU as sixty-eight percent of a nation's
average wage, and has formally found European nations in
noncompliance. 20 Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade
contributor Steven Herzenberg also offers an interesting solution to
minimum wage relativism by arguing for a formulaic minimum wage.
Under his proposal, workers as a whole would be paid some minimum por-
tion of the value added in manufacture as an acceptable wage (for example,
forty percent). The local minimum wage would be set at half this amount,
on the theory that the minimum wage should equal roughly half the average
manufacturing wage in a given country.'2 ' In light of the increasing
focus of global attention on child labor issues and the longstanding inability
of the present child labor convention to achieve consensus, the ILO is also
developing a new convention prohibiting the most intolerable forms of
child labor, which may be available for adoption by June 1999.'
B. The Debate over Linkage
The debate over linkage has proven intractable and tenacious. Efforts
to include worker rights considerations in the GATT have appeared con-
tinually from the GATT's founding in the 1940s to the most recent mini-
sterial conferences of the WTO, with little or no permanent progress.
Despite the promise of the NAFTA labor side accord, the United States's
conditioning of the GSP and other trade laws on labor rights compliance,
and the EU's tentative steps in this direction, linkage between labor rights
and trade agreements at the global level remains highly contentious.
Developing nations view proposals that labor rights should be treated as an
unfair trade practice as raw protectionism which infringes on their sover-
eignty and improperly strips them of their comparative advantage in low-
wage labor. These nations similarly view the United States's unilateral
enforcement regime as a hypocritical attempt to impose upon them inter-
national standards that the United States has not ratified and with which it
does not comply. Accusations of protectionism are bolstered by the fact
that many of the groups advocating strong international labor rights
119. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, APPENDIX B TO COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1997 E, supra note 66.
120. BETTEN, supra note 2, at 213-14 (describing the European approach used to determine a
"decent standard of living").
121. See Herzenberg, supra note 13, at 109.
122. See ILO, Human Rights, supra note 17.
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protections, particularly domestic trade unions, also have a substantial
interest in erecting barriers to foreign competition."2 The accusations of
hypocrisy are further supported by the United States's inconsistent imposi-
tion of trade sanctions for labor and human rights violations, most notably
by the exceptional treatment of trade with China, which the Clinton admin-
istration has disengaged from labor and human rights concerns. 24
Free trade economists and multinational corporations, on the other
hand, argue that incorporating labor and environmental "externalities" into
the global trading system will stifle economic development,121 and point
to the currently sluggish economies of the EU as confirmation of their
position. Even labor rights advocates disagree sharply over whether sanc-
tions or constructive engagement is the best way to protect worker rights.
Detractors of sanctions point out that withdrawing operations from a
country often hurts most the very workers who were intended to be helped.
In light of this opposition, it is not surprising that the immediate pros-
pects for extending linkage between labor and trade in new or existing
trade agreements appear dim. Recent efforts by the United States even to
discuss worker rights in the context of the GATT, for example, have been
thwarted repeatedly by developing countries. The Human Rights, Labor
Rights, and International Trade authors optimistically note that in 1994 the
United States finally succeeded in extracting an agreement to consider labor
rights issues in the next WTO negotiations. The U.S. Trade
Representative's prediction that the Clinton administration had overcome
international opposition to discussing labor standards, however, proved
premature. 126  Linkage was again strenuously opposed at the 1996
Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO by India and other develop-
ing nations, despite support for the initiative from Canada, the European
Commission, Norway, and the United States."
123. See Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, FOREIGN POL., Sept. 22, 1993, at 24
(arguing that concerns about economic competitiveness drive the AFL-CIO's critique of labor conditions
in Malaysia and elsewhere).
124. See Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Is to Maintain Trade Privileges for China's Goods, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1994, at Al (arguing that economic interests have supplanted human rights concerns
in dictating the course of U.S. foreign policy towards China).
125. MacShane, supra note 3, at 63 (discussing the opposition to a GATT "social clause").
126. See Michael Bergsman, Kantor Announces U.S. Has Secured GATT Deal to Discuss Labor
Rights, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 8, 1994, at S1.
127. See WTO: Ministers Agree to Do Nothing on Labour Standards, EUR. REP., Dec. 14, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS file. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration addressed
the issue as follows:
We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further
trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these [ILO] standards. We reject the
use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative
advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be
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Linkage issues also pose a major obstacle for future regional trade
agreements modeled on NAFTA. Although supporters of free trade fear
any worker rights linkage that might prove stronger than the NAALC,
labor advocates have rallied to oppose new trade agreements for fear that
they will not adequately protect international worker rights."z  The
Clinton administration has substantially retreated from its position at the
time of NAFTA that such agreements should include adequate worker
rights protections. 29 In the absence of such protections, President
Clinton's request for renewed fast track authority to negotiate a NAFTA-
type regional free trade agreement in the fall of 1997 was defeated by a
substantial backlash from U.S. labor. 3 °
III. Vindicating the Transnational Labor Rights Regime Through the Alien
Tort Claims Act
Whither the transnational labor rights regime? As discussed in Part
I of this essay, the vacuum of enforcement at the global level has spurred
the proliferation of other mechanisms. Much recent innovation at the inter-
section of trade and labor rights has occurred in nontraditional fora-
whether private corporations, administrative agencies, or nations' domestic
courts. In this context, it seems reasonable to predict that there will be a
future role for the United States's Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in the
articulation and enforcement of the prohibition against forced labor and
other fundamental worker rights.
A. A Remedy for Violations of the Law of Nations
The ATCA has played an important role in the rise of transnational
public law litigation,'3' and its recent contribution to human rights
put into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will
continue their existing collaboration.
WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 36 I.L.M. 220, 221
(1997). For further discussion of efforts to address linkage between labor and trade at the 1996
Conference, see Charnovitz, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards, supra note 1, at 154-58
(emphasizing the lack of substantive progress in U.S. efforts to firmly place labor standards on the
WTO agenda).
128. See Murphy, supra note 51, at 421.
129. See U.S. to Make "Less Noise" About Linking Trade to Labor, Environment, Official Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at D-13 (Feb. 17, 1995); see also Murphy, supra note 51, at 421
(quoting an EU statement that the United States "has stopped being an active champion of [linkage]
issues" and that the "EU must step in to fill the gap"); id. at 424-25 (noting that the OECD called for
an international agreement on basic worker rights after the Clinton administration "decided to downplay
worker rights as a WTO issue").
130. See Abramson & Greenhouse, supra note 14; Clinton Caves in on Trade Package, NAFTA
DIGEST, Dec. 1997, at 2.
131. For an excellent discussion of litigation under the ATCA, see generally BETH STEPHENS &
MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996); see also
Koh, supra note 9, at 2366-69 (discussing landmark cases related to the ATCA). Recent cases brought
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enforcement has in many ways paralleled developments in the efforts to
promulgate and enforce fundamental labor rights. Adopted by the first
Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the statute provides both a federal
cause of action and a federal forum for claims brought (1) by an alien; (2)
alleging a tort; (3) committed in violation of a U.S. treaty or the law of
nations. 132  To be actionable, the suit must simply state a claim for a
under the ATCA include: Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. 428 (1989)
(holding that foreign sovereign immunity barred claims under the ATCA against the Argentine
government); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that the pre-1996 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act barred ATCA claims for aircraft sabotage
against the Libyan government), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997); Abebe-Jira v. Negeivo, 72 F.3d
844 (11 th Cir.) (affirming a damages judgment under the ATCA against a former Ethiopian official for
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 96 (1996); Kadic v.
Karadi, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding alleged war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities com-
mitted by the leader of the Bosnian Serbs actionable under the ATCA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding justici-
able class action claims under the ATCA for torture, disappearance, and summary execution by the
Marcos regime in the Philippines); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that Argentina had impliedly waived foreign sovereign immunity to the plaintiffs' claims
of torture); Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing a claim
of arbitrary detention under the ATCA against corporate defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction
and insufficient evidence); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction an action brought against the PLO, the Libyan
government, and other entities, by Israeli citizens); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) (upholding jurisdiction under the ATCA for claims alleging torture by a Paraguayan official);
National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., No. CV 96-6112 RAPBQRX, 1997 WL 731512 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 5, 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (both finding actionable
claims that a U.S. corporation conspired with state actors in committing forced labor, torture, and other
human rights violations); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kalvin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding
claims that a Bolivian citizen conspired with Bolivian authorities to arbitrarily detain a Kodak employee
actionable under the ATCA); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997)
(finding that an Indonesian citizen failed to state a claim for environmental violations and genocide
under the ATCA against a U.S. mining corporation); Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing environmental claims against Texaco under the ATCA for failure to join
the Equadoran government and a state entity as indispensable parties); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921
F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding jurisdiction under the ATCA and the Torture Victim
Protection Act for claims alleging torture by a Ghanaian security official); Mushikiwabo v.
Barayagwiza, No. 94-CIV-3627, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding damages under the
ATCA against a Rwandan official for acts of genocide); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D.
Mass. 1995) (holding that the ATCA dictated compensatory and punitive damages for plaintiffs who
brought suit against the Guatemalan Minister of Defense for massive human rights injuries caused by
the armed forces); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding damages against a
former Haitian military official for torture, arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing ATCA claims against
the recognized leader of Haiti due to head-of-state immunity); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775
F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing environmental claims between two corporations for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA); and Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (finding a cause of action under the ATCA for claims of prolonged arbitrary detention,
torture, summary execution, and disappearance against a former Argentine general), as amended by
694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (providing for federal district courtjurisdiction over "any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States").
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tortious violation of contemporary international law-whether customary
law or a treaty-and the plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. Thus, the statute remarkably provides a domestic forum for
claims brought by aliens, against aliens or U.S. nationals, 33 for events
occurring wholly outside the United States, and stands as a unique trans-
national public law vehicle for the articulation and vindication of funda-
mental international rights.
34
The source of only limited litigation during its first 150 years, the
ATCA has received increasing attention from human rights litigators since
the seminal decision in Filartiga v. Pefia-lrala,t35 in which relatives of
a Paraguayan citizen who had been murdered by a police official in
Paraguay successfully sued the official for torture in the United States.
After the statute's near evisceration in the subsequent case of Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 36 Congress breathed new life into the ATCA with
the passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. In explaining
the basis for the new legislation, Congress embraced the interpretation of
the ATCA adopted in Filartiga and observed that "[the ATCA] should
remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or
may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law."' 3
Subsequent decisions consistently have found that Congress intended the
ATCA to provide subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action for vio-
lations of the law of nations.
The recent revival of the ATCA is producing a burgeoning body of
suits exploring the range of claims that can be considered violations of "the
law of nations" within the meaning of the statute. 3 8  Torture has been
a common claim under the ATCA, but courts have found a variety of other
claims to be cognizable as well. In Kadic v. KaradiW, 39 for example,
133. A question exists regarding whether claims under the ATCA may be asserted against United
States, as opposed to foreign, officials. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (holding that "[i]t would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign immunity" to allow
ATCA claims against Reagan Administration officials for international torts resulting from the covert
war in Nicaragua).
134. See Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law. Do Tort Remedies
Fit the Crime? 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 594 (1997) (discussing the ATCA as a means of redressing
human rights violations through private civil litigation).
135. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
136. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
138. See supra note 131. Courts have interpreted the statute's reference to violations of "the law
of nations" to include any "universal, definable, and obligatory international norms." See, e.g., Ford
v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Thus, a practice will be recognized as
actionable underthe ATCA if the norm is (1) generally recognized among states as prohibited; (2) suffi-
ciently defined so that the outlawed conduct is clear; and (3) considered binding, rather than merely
aspirational or desirable. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 131, at 51-52.
139. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
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the Second Circuit allowed Croat and Muslim victims of atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia to assert claims of genocide, torture, war crimes
(including rape), and extrajudicial killing against Radovan Karad~id, the
self-proclaimed leader of the Bosnian-Serb Republic." The court
observed that the list of claims actionable under the ATCA should include,
as a minimum, the rights recognized by the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States as peremptory norms of
customary international law. These include: (a) genocide; (b) slavery or
slave trade; (c) murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; (d)
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (e)
prolonged arbitrary detention; (f) systematic racial discrimination; and (g)
a consistent pattern or gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.' 4 ' To date, in addition to claims of torture, courts have held that
the ATCA allows consideration of claims alleging summary execution, 42
genocide and war crimes, 43 disappearance,'" arbitrary detention, 45
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.'" Environmental torts may
be actionable under section 1350,147 although no court has granted relief
on an international environmental tort claim.
Other suits are exploring the range of possible defendants and the
scope of state action requirements under the ATCA. The statutory lan-
guage does not limit defendants to natural persons or state officials, and
courts have heard claims against private individuals, corporations, and
associations. 4 ' Foreign governments, on the other hand, enjoy immunity
from suit unless their activities fall into some exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. 49
140. See id. at 237.
141. See id. at 240-44; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987). Section 404 of the Restatement additionally recognizes that universal jurisdiction
exists to define and prescribe punishment for acts of piracy, hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and
certain acts of terrorism, whether the action is taken by an official state actor or by a private individual.
Id. § 404.
142. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of Marcos,
Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass.
1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
143. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42.
144. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 185; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709-11
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
145. See, e.g., Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184-
85; Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
146. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187-89; see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844
(1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 96 (1996); Avril, 901 F. Supp. at 335.
147. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382-85 (E.D. La. 1997);
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93-CIV-7527, 1994 WL 142006, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994);
Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
148. See Bealance v. FRAHP, No. 94-2619 (E.D.N.Y., filed June 1, 1994) (involving a plaintiff
who is suing a Haitian paramilitary organization under the ATCA for torture).
149. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611(1994); Argentine Republic
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Although the ATCA does not require that the defendant have acted
under color of law, most courts have held that customary international law
itself imposes a state action requirement for claims of torture, summary
execution and disappearance, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, arbi-
trary detention, and systematic race discrimination.50 Such state action
requirements limit the availability of the ATCA for claims against private
individuals and corporations. Nevertheless, as with state action require-
ments under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act' and other domestic
laws, private persons and entities can be held liable as state actors where
they are "jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action."
5 2
Accordingly, ATCA suits recently have been brought against a number of
private corporations, alleging that violations of international law have
occurred through joint action with state officials.'53 On the other hand,
"certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by
those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (dismissing ATCA claims against the Argentine
government on foreign sovereign immunity grounds); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing claims against the Libyan government on foreign
sovereign immunity grounds), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). The 1996 amendment to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act waives sovereign immunity for countries designated as state sponsors
of terrorism in suits for damages resulting from torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or
hostage taking. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). Foreign sovereign immunity
is not available to governments that have waived immunity, either expressly or impliedly, see 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Argentina impliedly waived sovereign immunity by using the U.S. courts to obtain
jurisdiction over the plaintiff), or that have engaged in commercial activities in the United States or with
direct effects in the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349
(1993) (holding that foreign sovereign immunity barred a claim of an American national allegedly
tortured while employed by the Saudi Arabian government, because the employment was not "based
on" commercial activities in the United States).
150. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadi6, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing stte action in
the context of the leader of the Bosnian-Serb Republic), cert. denied, 116 S. C. 2524 (1996);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(1987) (listing
examples of typical state law violations of international human rights law).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
152. National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., No. CV96-6112 RAPBQRX, 1997 WL 731512,
at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1997) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (holding that
private actors who conspired to bribe a judge are liable as state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994))); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kalvin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-92 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that
allegations that a private citizen conspired with Bolivian officials to arbitrarily detain the plaintiff stated
a claim under the ATCA). For an excellent discussion of possible approaches to pleading state action
under the ATCA, see Jennifer A. Lloyd, Domestic Litigation of Human Rights Against Transnational
Corporations: The State Action Requirement (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas
Law Review).
153. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 111 (5th Cir. 1988); National
Coalition Gov't, 1997 WL 731512, at *1; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 369, 374-75; Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Aguinda, 1994 WL 142006, at *I.
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individuals."" 5 International law thus imposes no state action require-
ment for claims of piracy, slavery, or slave trading. 55
Remedies have proven a persistent problem in ATCA litigation.
Although substantial damages have been awarded to plaintiffs, 56 indi-
vidual defendants frequently default, and actual recovery generally requires
enforcement of the judgment in a foreign forum, against assets that are
hidden or non-existent. Few ATCA plaintiffs have successfully collected
on damages awards resulting from ATCA litigation, though the Marcos
plaintiffs are presently seeking to enforce their judgment against Ferdinand
Marcos's estate. Attorneys' fees may be awarded and depend on the law
which the court applies to the case. 57
The ATCA is not mentioned in Human Rights, Labor Rights, and
International Trade and has been largely neglected by labor rights activists,
no doubt due in part to the recent uncertainty regarding the statute's contin-
ued vitality and to the historical gulf between the human rights and labor
rights movements. Nevertheless, the statute could provide a domestic
vehicle for vindicating some of the most fundamental international labor
rights violations. As several of the Human Rights, Labor Rights, and
International Trade authors note, many of the basic human rights violations
committed around the world are directed at labor rights activists and union
organizers, who often are victims of summary execution, torture, and
arbitrary detention,' either at the hands of governments or as a result
of joint action between state officials and private parties. Often today, as
Yale's labor historian David Montgomery observes,
the most urgent need is simply for the protection of individual trade
unionists who are prosecuted, or threatened with disappearance, in
Guatemala, in South Korea, or even in Los Angeles, where exiled
Salvadoran union activists have been pursued by agents of the
Salvadoran military. In 1992 alone, according to the records of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 260 people were
killed around the world for trade union activity, and some 2,500
were imprisoned. 5 9
"Disappearances" of labor leaders were common occurrences in Guatemala
in the 1980s,160 as they were under the Argentinean military regime in
154. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding $10
million in damages). In the Marcos litigation, damages totaling approximately $2 billion were awarded
to the 10,000 member class. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995).
157. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 131, at 217-18.
158. See Leary, supra note 31, at 22-23 (noting that repressive regimes "inevitably try to suppress
or control" labor unions and detailing the violent means used to achieve that goal).
159. David Montgomery, supra note 21, at 18-19.
160. See Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and
Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 136-37 (1993).
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the 1970s. 111 China continues to arbitrarily detain labor activists.162
Summary execution and disappearance, torture, and arbitrary detention in
this context unquestionably constitute violations of peremptory international
norms that are actionable under the ATCA against foreign officials, and
individuals and companies who collude in such conduct.
Slavery, servitude, and forced labor also remain widespread in various
parts of the world. According to Michael Platzer of the United Nations
Centre for International Crime Prevention, approximately 200 million
people in the world today are "victims of contemporary forms of
slavery,"'6 while the U.S. State Department also reports, among others,
that slavery persists in the Sudan,"6 and that forced or compulsory labor
remains a serious problem in Burma. 6 The 1996 OECD Study of labor
practices in ninety-one countries noted serious problems regarding forced
labor in Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan."6 Slave-like practices take
a number of forms in the modern world, including debt bondage, private
convict labor, child bondage, traffic in women for purposes of prostitution,
and forced marriage. Around the world, the victims of forced labor most
commonly are women, children, immigrants, and domestic and migrant
workers-all groups which,, for reasons of distance from their homeland,
gender, youth, poverty, and social status, are particularly vulnerable to
exploitation.
Debt bondage remains one of the most severe and pernicious forms of
forced labor. Typically, bonded labor plays out in the following manner:
[W]orkers are hired on the basis of false information as regards
working conditions and wages on estates thousands of kilometers
away. On arrival, wages turn out to be lower than promised and the
workers are charged for transport and accommodation. The only
161. See NUNCA MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
DISAPPEARED 368-81 (Farrar Straus Giroux 1986) (1984); AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL
JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA: AN UPDATE 17-19 (1991).
162. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1997 §§ l(d), 6(1) (1998), available in (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/globall
humanrights/1997_hrpreportchina.htnl> (discussing recent arbitrary imprisonments of labor
activists for subversion).
163. Michael Specter, Traffickers'New Cargo:Nalve Slavic Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998,
at Al.
164. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SUDAN COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1997 § 6(c) (1998) available in (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/
humanrights/1997 hrpreport/sudan.html >(reporting that "the numberof cases of slavery, servitude,
slave trade, and forced labor have increased alarmingly").
165. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BURMA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1997 § 6(c) (1998), available in (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/
humanrights/1997_hrpreportburma.html>.
166. See OECD STUDY, supra note 1, at 47. Notably, the study excluded any examination of
labor practices in the countries of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, large portions of Africa,
and some countries of the Middle East. See id. at 39-40.
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place to obtain food is the company store which charges exorbitant
prices and purchases are deducted from wages. When workers claim
their pay, they discover it has been entirely "spent" as their debt is
by then higher than their wages. Workers who try to escape from
the estate are pursued by gunmen and when they are caught and
returned they are subjected to ill treatment in many cases resulting
in death. 67
Although this excerpt was drafted with reference to bonded labor practices
in Brazil, 68 the practice is replicated with Haitian sugarcane workers in
the Dominican Republic, workers in the Peruvian mining industry, and
brick-kiln workers in Pakistan.16 9 Unfortunately, it applies equally to
immigrant garment workers and migrant agricultural workers in the United
States, who are often recruited in Mexico and Central America on false
representations and then forced to work off their transportation
"debts. "170
167. BEITrEN, supra note 2, at 141.
168. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, CCPR
COMMENTARY 144; see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOUR, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, BRAZIL COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997 § 6(c) (1998),
available in (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights!
1997_hrpreport/brazil.html> ("Labor organizations allege that in mining and the rural economy
thousands of workers, including minors, are hired on the basis of false promises, subjected to debt
bondage, with violence used to retain or punish workers who attempt to escape .. .
169. See BETTEN, supra note 2, at 135-45.
170. In 1997, for example, Miguel Flores, a Mexican farm labor contractor, pleaded guilty to
coercing migrant workers in South Carolina to harvest cucumbers against their will and was sentenced
to 15 years in prison. Flores had been charged with recruiting workers in Mexico and smuggling them
to South Carolina labor camps, where they were threatened with physical abuse and death to prevent
them from leaving. See Child Labor, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, Jan. 1998, at 5; see also Ky
Henderson, The New Slavery: Immigrants Hoping to Forge a Better Life Are at the Mercy of Greedy
Smugglers, HUM. RTS., Fall 1997, at 12, 12 (reporting that Flores pleaded guilty to 25 "counts of
enslavement, extortion, and immigration and labor violations"). Since 1990, the U.S. Justice
Department has prosecuted at least 50 people for violations of domestic antislavery laws, at least 44
of whom were convicted or pleaded guilty. Recent revelations regarding the slave-like practices used
to exploit Thai garment workers in California, deaf Mexican trinket sellers in New York City, and
migrant workers in South Carolina and Florida confirm that such practices remain a vexing problem
in the United States. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Woman Pleads Guilty in Case of Deaf Mexican
Peddlers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at B13 (reporting that "threats of violence were used" to force
deaf Mexicans to work and hold them against their will); Kenneth B. Noble, Los Angeles Sweatshops
Are Thriving, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1995, at 6 (discussing recent Justice Department
prosecutions under U.S. anti-slavery laws); Kenneth B. Noble, U.S. Warns Big Retailers About
Sweatshop Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at A14 (reporting on the U.S. Department of Labor
investigation into a sweatshop where Thai immigrants were held in "prison-like conditions," working
up to twenty-two hours a day for as little as fifty cents an hour); Joe Sexton, Guilty Plea in Smuggling
of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at B3 (reporting the guilty plea of Adriana Paoletti, who
conspired to smuggle deaf Mexican immigrants into a "brutal slavery ring"); Sweatshop Workers Share
$1.1 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at All (reporting that Thai and Hispanic garment workers
received back pay totaling $1.1 million from employers convicted on federal slavery charges).
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B. The International Prohibition of Forced Labor
International law draws technical distinctions between slavery, "slave-
like" practices, and forced labor. The U.N. Human Rights Committee,
which is responsible for oversight and interpretation of the ICCPR, has
described the relationship among these practices as follows:
As with torture, the official abolition of and international ban on
slavery have led to the development of more subtle forms and to
their underground practice. The classic degradation of the human
being to the mere property of another has given way to highly
sophisticated forms of personal dependence and economic
exploitation. '
7
"Slavery," in its strict sense, is defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention
as "the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised."" The focus is on the
loss of legal personhood. Servitude or "slave-like" practices, as defined
in the 1957 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,"
include debt bondage, 74 serfdom,' 7 compulsory marital
arrangements, 76 and the sale of children into labor." Like slavery,
171. NOWAK, supra note 168, at 144.
172. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, art. 1(1), 46 Star. 2183,
2191, 60 L.N.T.S. 253,263 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery Convention]. The Convention defines the "slave
trade" as:
all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce
him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or
exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view
to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.
Id. art. 1(2), 46 Stat. at 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. at 263.
173. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1957
Supplementary Convention].
174. Debt bondage is defined as:
the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of
those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services
as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and
nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined.
Id. art. 1(a), 18 U.S.T. at 3204, 266 U.N.T.S. at 41.
175. Serfdom is defined as "the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement
bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service
to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status." Id. art. 1(b),
18 U.S.T. at 3204, 266 U.N.T.S. at 41.
176. The 1957 Supplementary Convention prohibits any circumstance in which:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on
payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any
other person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to
another person for value received or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person.
Id. art. 1(c), 18 U.S.T. at 3205, 266 U.N.T.S. at 41.
177. The Supplementary Slavery Convention prohibits
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such practices are prohibited regardless of whether the individual voluntar-
ily offers herself for the bonded condition. Forced or compulsory labor,
on the other hand, requires involuntariness and is defined by the ILO
Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) as "all work or service which is
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily."178 While the prohi-
bitions against slavery and servitude are nonderogable, international
conventions recognize certain exceptions to the prohibition against forced
labor.'79 Finally, the international prohibitions of slavery, servitude, and
forced labor apply to state actors and private entities alike. States are
obligated to take affirmative steps to ensure the realization of the
prohibition,"g including the imposition of criminal sanctions."'
In sum, slavery, servitude, and forced labor may be understood as
follows:
Slavery indicates that [the person] is wholly in the legal ownership
of another person, while servitude concerns less far-reaching forms
of restraint and refers, for instance, to the total of the labour
conditions and/or the obligation to work or to render services from
which the person in question cannot escape and which he cannot
change. Forced labour and compulsory labour, on the other hand,
do not refer to the total situation of the person concerned, but
exclusively to the involuntary character of the work."u
[any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18
years is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another
person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young
person or of his labour.
Id. art. 1(d), 18 U.S.T. at 3205, 266 U.N.T.S. at 41.
178. Forced Labour Convention, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 39 U.N.T.S. at 58, reprinted in 1
LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 115.
179. The Forced Labour Convention excludes from the definition of forced labor military service,
normal civic obligations and minor communal services, prison labor when performed under public
supervision and pursuant to a lawful conviction, and work exacted in cases of emergency. See id. art.
2(2), 39 U.N.T.S. at 58, reprinted in 1 LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 116. Similar excep-
tions are recognized under Article 8 of the ICCPR. See infra note 195.
180. See NOWAK, supra note 168, at 145.
181. The 1957 Supplementary Convention, for example, obligates states parties "to bring about
... the complete abolition" of all slave-like practices, see supra note 173, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. at 3204,
266 U.N.T.S. at 41, including imposing criminal penalties for such conduct. See id. art. 3, 18 U.S.T.
at 3205, 266 U.N.T.S. at 42 (requiring criminal sanctions for slave trading); id. art. 6, 18 U.S.T. at
3206, 266 U.N.T.S. at 43 (requiring criminal penalties for slavery or servitude). Article 25 of the ILO
Forced Labour Convention requires states to make forced labour "punishable as a penal offence." See
Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, supra note 19, art. 25, 39 U.N.T.S. at 74,
reprinted in I LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 123. The ICCPR also obligates states parties
to provide effective domestic remedies for any individuals whose rights recognized by the treaty have
been violated. See ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 2(3)(a), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174, 6 I.L.M. at 369; see also
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 144 (discussing the imposition of penalties for slavery and
forced labor under international law).
182. P. VAN DUK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
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As numerous courts have observed, slavery shares a position with
torture, piracy, and genocide as one of the most fundamental international
law violations."u The prohibitions of forced labor and slave-like
practices are now widely recognized in conjunction with slavery as
customary international norms. Most international instruments address the
prohibitions against these practices coterminously. Thus, the 1926 Slavery
Convention, the basic international instrument prohibiting slavery,
commits states to eradicate forced labor for any nonpublic purpose, t"
and the 1957 Supplementary Convention sets forth the basic definitions of
debt bondage and other slave-like practices."u Numerous other
international instruments prohibit slavery, servitude, and forced labor,
including the American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 6),11 the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Art. 4),11 the European Social Charter (Art. 1),18 the
African Charter of Human and People's Rights (Art. 5),189 and the U.N.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 242 (2d ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995)
(describing torture, murder, genocide, and slavery asjus cogens norms), amended on denial of reh 'g
and reh "g en banc, 98 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 1996); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980) ("Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and the slave
trader before him-hostis humanis generis, an enemy of all mankind."). The Restatement recognizes
the prohibition against slavery and the slave trade as jus cogens norms. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, cmt. a (1987). Although the
Restatement does not specifically mention forced labor and other slave-like practices, it indicates that
its list does not purport to be comprehensive. Id. § 702 cmt. a.
184. See 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 172, art. 5(2), 46 Stat. at 2191-93, 60 L.N.T.S.
at 265.
185. See 1957 Supplementary Convention, supra note 173, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. at 3204, 266
U.N.T.S. at 41.
186. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 9 I.L.M. 99
(entered into force July 18, 1978). Article 6 of the Convention provides in relevant part as follows:
1. No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in all
their forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.
Id. art. 6, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 146, 9 I.L.M. at 103. The Convention includes exceptions to the
prohibition on forced labor similar to those set forth in the ICCPR. See infra note 195.
187. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36,
art. 4, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224-27. Article 4 provides in relevant part as follows:
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
Id. The Convention includes exceptions to the prohibition on forced or compulsory labor similar to
those set forth in the ICCPR. See infra note 195.
188. Obligating contracting parties "to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living
in an occupation freely entered upon." European Social Charter, supra note 37, art. 1, 529 U.N.T.S.
at 94.
189. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59, 60
(1981).
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Exploitation or the Prostitution of Others."9 The ILO's Forced Labour
Convention 9' and the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced
Labour (No. 105) are both deemed "fundamental" human rights
conventions by the ILO.' 9 Indeed, the Forced Labour Convention is the
most widely ratified instrument of the ILO, with 143 states party to the
agreement. 193
The ICCPR, which has now been ratified or accepted by 140
states, 194 prohibits all forms of slavery and forced labor. Article 8 of the
ICCPR states in relevant part as follows:
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade
in all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labour. 95
190. U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation or the
Prostitution of Others, Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 (entered into force July 25, 1951).
191. The ILO Forced Labour Convention provides in relevant part as follows:
Article 1
1. Each Member [state] . . . undertakes to suppress the use of forced or
compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.
Article 4
1. [Member states] shall not impose or permit the imposition of forced or
compulsory labour for the benefit of private individuals, companies, or associations.
2. Where such forced or compulsory labour for the benefit of private individuals,
companies, or associations exists at the date on which a Member's ratification of this
Convention is registered by the Director-General of the International Labour Office, the
Member shall completely suppress such forced or compulsory labour from the date on
which this Convention comes into force for that member.
Article 5
1. No concession granted to private individuals, companies, or associations shall
involve any form of forced or compulsory labour for the production or the collection of
products which such private individuals, companies, or associations utilize or in which
they trade.
2. Where concessions exist containing provisions involving such forced or
compulsory labour, such provisions shall be rescinded as soon as possible, in order to
comply with Article I of this Convention.
Forced Labour Convention, supra note 19, arts. 1, 4, 5, 39 U.N.T.S. at 56-60, reprinted in, I LABOUR
CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 115-17.
192. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. One hundred twenty states have also ratified the
Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105).
194. The United Nations reports that, to date, the ICCPR has 59 signatory states and 140 state
parties. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (visited Mar. 10, 1998)
<http://www.un.org/deptsltreaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part boo/ivboo/iv_4.html>.
195. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175, 6 .L.M. at 371. The ICCPR excludes
from the definition of "forced or compulsory labor" the following: (a) hard labor imposed as
punishment for a crime; (b) work normally imposed in consequence of a lawful court order; (c) military
and national service; and (d) service exacted in cases of emergency threatening the life and well-being
of the community. Id. art. 8(3)(b), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175, 6 I.L.M. at 371.
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The travaux pr6paratoires of the ICCPR indicate that the drafters defined
slavery, servitude, and forced labor according to the existing Conventions
on the issue. Thus, "slavery" was understood in the narrow sense set forth
in Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention.'96 Servitude, by
contrast, was intended by the drafters to apply broadly to all "slave-like
practices" as defined in the 1957 Supplementary Convention." 9  The
drafters of the ICCPR also looked to the ILO Forced Labour Convention
for the definition of forced or compulsory labor, though they did not adopt
the exceptions set forth in that Convention. 9 '
The United States has ratified four of the most important international
instruments prohibiting slavery and forced labor, including the 1926 and
1957 Slavery Conventions, and ILO Convention No. 105.1'9 Although
the United States has not ratified the ILO Forced Labour Convention, it did
finally ratify the ICCPR in 1992, which incorporates the forced labor defi-
nition of that instrument.' Thus, the fundamental prohibitions against
slavery and forced labor are binding treaty obligations on the United States,
as with the majority of the world.
196. See MARCJ. BOSSUYT, GUIDETO THE "TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 167 (1987) ("[S]Iavery, which implied the destruction
of the judicial personality, was a relatively limited and technical notion.").
197. NOWAK, supra note 168, at 148; see also Nina Lassen, Slavery and Slavey-Like Practices:
United Nations Standards and Implementation, 57 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 197, 207 (1988) (outlining
institutions and practices that are deemed by the 1957 Supplementary Convention to be similar to
slavery). The proposals of the U.S. delegation that the term "servitude" be substituted with "peonage
or serfdom" or "involuntary servitude" were viewed by the Human Rights Committee as too narrow
and as failing to protect against the possibility that individuals might voluntarily contract themselves
into bondage. See BOSSUYT, supra note 196, at 167; NOWAK, supra note 168, at 148.
198. See BOSSUYT, supra note 196, at 169 ("This definition, especially when read in the light of
the exceptions, was not considered entirely satisfactory for inclusion in the covenant.").
199. The Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), which is narrower
in scope than the Forced Labour Convention, obligates states parties to:
suppress and not make use of any form of forced or compulsory labour-
(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for the holding or
expressing of political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political,
social or economic system;
(b) as a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development;
(c) as a means of labour discipline;
(d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes;
(e) as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.
Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), supra note 19, S. EXEC. REP. NO.
102-07, 320 U.N.T.S. at 295-96, reprinted in 1 LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 618-19.
200. The United States has declared that the ICCPR is not self-executing. See U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 138 CONG. REc. S4781, S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) ("[T]he United States declares that
the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing."). The United States
has represented to the U.N. Human Rights Committee that "notwithstanding the non-self-executing
declaration of the United States, American courts are not prevented from seeking guidance from the
Covenant in interpreting American law." Comments of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1413th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79lAdd.50 (1995).
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C. The Present Status of ATCA Labor Litigation
Despite the fact that slavery and forced labor enjoy a status akin to
torture in the international human rights lexicon, the ATCA has been
largely neglected as a means for enforcing this prohibition or any other
core international labor standard. To date, only two published cases have
been filed under section 1350 alleging international labor violations,
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc.,2°1
and Doe v. Unocal Corp.2 2 In those two cases, Burmese nationals and
the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB) sued the Unocal
Corporation for human rights and labor violations committed during the
construction of a natural gas pipeline in cooperation with entities of the
Myanmar government.'0 3 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the pro-
ject had exploited forced labor to assist in the construction of the pipeline
and an accompanying railway, and that these forced labor practices had
saved the project approximately $159 million dollars annually.'0° The
plaintiffs contended that Unocal was liable as a joint venturer in the project
and because Unocal knew of, authorized, acquiesced in, or ratified the
human rights abuses committed during the course of the project and con-
spired to injure the plaintiffs. In 1997, the federal district court in
California denied Unocal's motions to dismiss the forced labor claims, con-
cluding that the allegations that Unocal knowingly accepted the benefit of,
and approved the use of, forced labor could be sufficient to state a claim
for participation in slave trading.2 5 The court has not specifically
201. No. CV96-6112, 1997 WL 731512 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1997).
202. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
203. The complaints state claims for torture, forced labor, expropriation of property, and sexual
assault. The district court dismissed the expropriation claims based on the act of state doctrine, see
Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 899 (holding prudential concerns in the act of state doctrine preclude
consideration of expropriation claims), and for failure to state a claim under international law, see
National Coalition Gov't, 1997 WL 731512, at *23 (holding that "expropriation by a sovereign state
of the property of its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international law").
204. See National Coalition Gov't, 1997 WL 731512, at *3. In describing these labor practices,
the court stated:
Plaintiff John Doe I ... alleges that, on several occasions, [the government] has subjected
him to forced labor, without compensation and under threat of death, on various railroad
and pipeline projects in connection with and in the ordinary course of business of the
Project. Specifically, he alleges he was forced to clear jungle along the path of the Ye-
Tavoy railroad; forced to build military barracks for a SLORC camp in the pipeline
region; and forced to build barracks and helipad facilities, clear jungle and land, break
rocks for construction, and carry sand and rocks for construction .... He alleges he
frequently witnessed physical abuse and brutality against other forced laborers, including
one worker who was beaten until he vomited blood and was then tied to a stake for 15
hours.
Id. at *4.
205. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 892. The Unocal Corp. court stated:
Although there is no allegation that [the government] is physically selling Burmese citizens
to the private defendants, plaintiffs allege that, despite their knowledge of [the] practice
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addressed whether the customary international prohibition against forced
labor itself is actionable under the ATCA. 2  Indeed, to date, no court
has considered a forced labor or slavery claim under section 1350 on the
merits.?
D. Prospects for Alien Tort Claims Act Labor Litigation
What can ATCA suits against individuals or corporations accomplish
in enforcing worker rights? Obviously, labor suits under the ATCA cannot
redress many of the problems considered by the authors in Human Rights,
Labor Rights, and International Trade. Some "core" labor rights may be
either sufficiently difficult to apply in practice, or lack sufficient
definitional acceptance by the international community, to be effectively
promoted under the ATCA. Nor can suits alleging customary international
law and treaty violations redress the pervasive problems created by low-
wage forms of work organization (exploitatively low wages, poor working
conditions, and lack of opportunities for skills development or
advancement) that lie at the root of many international labor violations.
Litigation under the ATCA also faces a number of procedural hurdles.
Although intended to redress violations of international law committed
against foreigners, personal jurisdiction must be established over the
defendant, generally by means of service of process somewhere in the
United States."8 Individuals and corporate entities who engage in gross
labor violations but evade the United States forum thus cannot be reached.
Absent evidence of governmental collusion, the state action requirement
may also preclude suits against strictly private actors for certain inter-
national torts (for example, torture, extra-judicial killing, and
of forced labor.. . the private defendants have paid and continue to pay [the government]
to provide labor and security for the pipeline, essentially treating [the government] as an
overseer, accepting the benefit and approving the use of forced labor. These allegations
are sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under [section 1350].
Id.; see also National Coalition Gov't, 1997 WL 731512, at *16 (noting that although the allegations
of forced labor may have justified a claim for participation in slave trading, the court did not need to
resolve the issue). In support of its motions, Unocal argued that the government's requirement that its
citizens provide labor for the project was more analogous to a national service requirement than to
slavery. Id.
206. The court also noted that Burma is a signatory to the ILO Forced Labour Convention. See
National Coalition Govt, 1997 WL 731512, at *21.
207. One of the earliest ATCA cases, Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607),
involved three slaves who had been seized as a prize of war. The issue presented in the case, however,
was the restitution of property, not the legality of slavery under international law.
208. See Kadic v. Karadi, 70 F.3d 232, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding the sufficiency of
service of process), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835
F.2d 109, 112 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing all but one corporate defendant for insufficiency of service
of process and lack of personal jurisdiction).
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arbitrary detention), although notably not for claims of slavery and forced
labor.0
As in the Pico and Bhopal cases, the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens may pose a substantial, but surmountable, obstacle for ATCA labor
rights litigants. The success of a motion to dismiss on forum non conven-
iens grounds turns in large part on the availability of an adequate, alter-
native forum for the claims.21 The doctrine has not been significant in
ATCA cases to date. Indeed, no court has dismissed an ATCA suit on
forum non conveniens grounds, despite the fact that ATCA plaintiffs by
definition are aliens who may be entitled to less deference in their choice
of forum.2 ' This is partly attributable to the fact that the defense is
waived by defendants who default, and partly to the fact that the suits often
involve allegations of egregious official conduct. Courts are understand-
ably reluctant to find that foreign governments which tolerate torture or
genocide will provide an adequate remedy for these violations, or to protect
a plaintiff alleging such claims." 2 In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kalvin,"3
for example, the court had little difficulty finding that the Bolivian
corporate defendant had demonstrated that the balance of public and private
interests favored the Bolivian forum." 4 Nevertheless, the court rejected
209. On the other hand, the act of state doctrine generally does not obstruct claims alleging
violations of peremptory international norms. As the Second Circuit observed in Kadic, "it would be
a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under section 1350," since by definition,
jus cogens norms actionable under section 1350 share sufficient international consensus that actions
taken in violation of them cannot be considered official acts of state. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250; see also
In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table
decision) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the Ferdinand Marcos litigation on act of state
grounds).
210. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,254-55,260-61 (1981) (affirming a dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds of a suit seeking damages for the deaths of Scottish nationals resulting
from an airplane crash in Scotland). Other important considerations include the private and public
interests in maintaining the action in the forum. Id. at 255.
211. Id. at 255. But see Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 179 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991)
(observing that lack of deference to a foreign national's choice of forum can be overcome by a strong
showing of convenience).
212. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250-51 ("[l]t seems evident that the courts of the former Yugoslavia,
either in Serbia or war-torn Bosnia, are not now available to entertain plaintiffs' claims, even if
circumstances concerning the location of witnesses and documents were presented that were sufficient
to overcome the plaintiffs' preference for a United States forum."); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.
Supp. 1189, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that "to force [the] plaintiff to bring this action in Ghana
would unnecessarily put him in harm's way").
213. 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
214. See id. at 1083-84. With respect to the private factors, the court noted as follows:
[E]verything connected with this case happened in Bolivia. The seventy-year relationship
between Kodak and Casa Kalvin occurred solely in Bolivia, which was also the cite [sic]
of Mr. Carballo's imprisonment, the negotiations to secure his release, [and] the
subsequent criminal prosecutions.. . . If the lawsuit were to take place in the United
States, almost all relevant documents would have to be translated into English, and
interpreters would be required for many, if not most, witnesses. All claims in the Kodak
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the forum non conveniens arguments, finding, in light of the plaintiff's
extensive evidence regarding targeted corruption in the Bolivian legal
system, that the defendants had failed to meet their burden of establishing
that Bolivia was an adequate alternative forum.215
Corporate defendants in ATCA labor suits may experience somewhat
greater success in claims of forum non conveniens. Multinational corpora-
tions are less likely to default than individual defendants, and suits alleging
labor violations such as forced labor do not require allegations of direct
governmental misconduct which necessarily raise questions about the
adequacy of the foreign forum.216
Nevertheless, any defendant seeking dismissal in favor of a foreign
forum bears a substantial burden of proof. U.S. corporate defendants in
ATCA suits may have a difficult time justifying dismissal of a suit from
their domicile, and courts may be less willing to dismiss suits where
foreign corporate defendants have control over their witnesses and, thus,
are able to produce them in the distant forum.217 Congress also has
clearly indicated that the ATCA should be available to remedy such
violations."' 8 Moreover, countries that tolerate forced labor or other
fundamental labor violations on a widespread basis are unlikely to provide
an adequate remedy for such injuries, if they provide any remedy at
all.219 In short, properly applied, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
does not appear to conflict with the goals of the ATCA in allowing a rem-
edy for international law violations.
The second potential barrier to ATCA litigation against corporations
is the problem of establishing liability by piercing the corporate veil.
Corporate structures leading to extreme labor violations can be very
complex, with multiple layers of subcontractors shielding the questionable
operations, as the Kathie Lee Gifford case illustrates. Gifford's Wal-Mart
contract required that she be informed of the companies that were produc-
ing her clothing, and her contract indicated a New York company that
case arise under Bolivian law; thus extensive translation and expert testimony as to the
meaning of Bolivian law would be necessary were the lawsuit to proceed in Florida.
Id. The court found the public factors favoring the foreign forum even more compelling, since enter-
taining the plaintiff's claims would "involve this Court in sitting in judgment upon the alleged
corruption of a nation's entire legal system." Id. at 1084.
215. Id. at 1087.
216. See Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93-CIV-7527, 1994 W'L 142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994)
(considering dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens).
217. See Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting the
forum non conveniens argument in part because "the access to sources of proof and the availability of
witnesses are ... in [the] defendant's control").
218. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
219. Cf. Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 897 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the statute of




would subcontract a portion of the work to a garment manufacturer in
Alabama. What the contract did not reveal was that the Alabama firm in
turn sub-subcontracted the work to a New Jersey company, which sub-sub-
subcontracted the work to a sweatshop in the New York garment
district. '2 When such operations are made more complex by intervening
national borders, attributing conduct to a multinational parent can be a
difficult task. Finally, of course, litigation often is a blunt, unwieldy, and
expensive instrument for accomplishing any transnational public law goals.
On the other hand, ATCA suits against corporations alleging forced
labor or other labor claims may avoid many of the difficulties commonly
confronted by ATCA plaintiffs. State action requirements would not
obstruct suits alleging slavery or forced labor. Because such suits are more
likely to involve private defendants than governments or public officials,
claims that the suit implicates the political question or act of state doctrines
may be less likely to arise. Actions of foreign governments that violate
fundamental labor rights may also fall within the commercial activities
exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Personal jurisdiction may be
more easily obtained over corporate actors than other foreign defendants
(setting aside the piercing the corporate veil issues discussed above), since
many multinational corporations are domiciled in or conduct substantial
operations in the United States. If liability is successfully established,
remedies are also more likely to be available. Corporations-at least those
with high public profiles and substantial assets-are both less likely to
default and more likely to have substantial, reachable assets, than tradi-
tional individual ATCA defendants.
As a domestic policy matter, enforcement of forced labor through the
ATCA would help bring the United States more fully into compliance with
its affirmative international obligations in this area. Although existing U.S.
law prohibits peonage and involuntary servitude," - the U.S. Supreme
Court has adopted a restrictive interpretation of "involuntary servitude"
that is not clearly coterminous with the international prohibition of forced
labor.' U.S. law thus appears to preclude the possibility that
220. See Strom, supra note 86 (describing the Gifford clothing production chain).
221. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction."); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994) (prohibiting any conspiracy to
prevent the free exercise of a citizen's constitutional rights); 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1994) (authorizing
criminal punishment of any individual who knowingly and willfully holds any person in involuntary
servitude or sells a person into a condition of involuntary servitude); see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219 (1911) (holding unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment a statute compelling labor
in liquidation of a debt).
222. Compare Forced Labour Convention, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 39 U.N.T.S. at 58, reprinted
in 1 LABOUR CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 115 (defining forced labor as "work or service which
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not
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involuntary servitude or forced labor could result from blackmail or
psychological coercion, in possible violation of U.S. obligations under the
ICCPR and customary international law.'
IV. Conclusion
In the end, the authors of Human Rights, Labor Rights, and
International Trade are concerned with the viability of increased enforce-
ment of labor rights in a world where existing mechanisms are scattered
and the ATCA is available to redress the most universally abhorred forms
of labor violations. Proposals regarding a universal minimum wage, a cut-
off age for child labor, and acceptable working conditions may be
controversial. But workers, companies, and nations can agree that it is a
violation of international law for companies to produce goods with forced
or slave labor, or for states to murder, arbitrarily detain, or torture union-
organizing officials. As for those presently accused of committing war
crimes, political torture and executions, and genocide, for individuals and
corporations which contact the U.S. forum, the ATCA stands as a warning
that fundamental labor violations will not be tolerated. The ATCA thus
can fill an important niche in underscoring the United States's abhorrence
for violations of those basic principles on which the global community can
agree. Within the fabric of the transnational labor rights regime that the
authors depict, there is a place for the ATCA.
offered himself voluntarily"), with United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (holding that
involuntary servitude under U.S. law means "a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to
work . . . by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of
coercion through law or the legal process").
223. See Joey Asher, Comment, How the United States Is Violating Its International Agreements
to Combat Slavery, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 215, 219-20 (1994).
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